1-%E2%80%93-Lenti-Politics-of-the-Our-Father-and-the-Holy-Father-Don-Boscos-Mediation-in-Church-State-Affairs(1999)


1-%E2%80%93-Lenti-Politics-of-the-Our-Father-and-the-Holy-Father-Don-Boscos-Mediation-in-Church-State-Affairs(1999)

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Politics of the "Our Father" and of the Holy
Father
Don Bosco's Mediation in Church-State Affairs
By Arthur J. Lenti, SDB
Introduction
T he reader of any popular biography of Don Bosco, even a full length
one, will probably come across only the merest reference to his
activity as mediator between Church and state in Italy in the times of
their estrangement following the liberal revolution, the unification and the
taking of Rome. And yet such mediating activity is attested for a period of
some 20 years (1858-1878) and appears as a quite extraordinary feature in the
life of the humble and otherwise politically uninvolved priest of Valdocco.
Don Bosco's efforts as a "negotiator" were chiefly concerned with filling
vacant diocesan sees, the bishops of which had either been expelled or
imprisoned, or had died. The appointment of bishops, therefore, was an
important objective of this activity. At a later period the principal purpose of
such mediation was to obtain the so-called Exequatur after appointment. This
was a state-issued permit that enabled bishops to enter their sees and obtain
possession of assets and revenues, held by the government, now needed to run
the diocese-the so-cailed "temporalities."
It is the purpose of this article to tell the story of Don Bosco's efforts to
have bishops appointed and to mediate related matters between the Holy See
and the Italian government. The Biographical Memoirs have given some
attention to this activity, especially in its later phases. Father Francesco Motto
in a series of articles and Father Francis Desrarnaut in his biography of Don
Bosco have written critically on the subject. This essay will be based mainly
on these sources, as well as on some material preserved in the Central Salesian
Archive.1
1 Bibliographical Note
Gioachino Berto, Vescovi, Nomina, Temporalita, in Central Salesian Archive
[ASC]: 112 Documenti, FDB 788 Bl2 - 789 C7; 132 Autografi, FDB 789 C8-10.
This box contains a collection of testimonies relating to Don Bosco' s involvement
in negotiations, transcribed by Father Gioachino Berto, some printed material, and
some papers in Don Bosco' s hand. [Berto Collection]
Gioachino Berto, Compendio dell'andatata di Don Bosco a Roma nel 1873 {... ],
in ASC 110 Cronachette, Berto, FDB 906 C8ff. [Berto, Compendia]; Appunti sul
viaggio di D. Bosco a Roma, 1873 (Notes on Don Bosco' s Trip to Rome, 1873), in
ASC 110 Cronachette, Berto, FDB 907 D12ff. [Berto, Appunti]; Brevi appunti pel
viaggio di D. Bosco a Roma nel 1873-74 {... ](Brief Notes on Don Bosco's Trip to

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Journal of Salesian Studies
How, why and in what circumstances did this remarkable involvement
come about? Don Bosco was certainly not an important person. He was of
peasant origins, he was not highly educated, he was not highly placed in the
Church. As he often emphasized, he was not involved in politics or in public
life. His charitable work, important and successful though it was, did not
Rome in 1873-74), 1-117; Table of Contents, 118-148, in ASC 110 Chronachette,
Berto, FDB 908 BS - 910 C3 and 910 C4 - 911 A8. [Berto, Brevi Appunti]
Giovanni Bosco, Epistolario. Introduzione, testi critici e note, a cura di
Francesco Motto. Vol. I (1835-1863); Vol. Il (1864-1868); Vol. Ill (1869-1872)
(Roma: LAS, 1991, 1996, 1999). [Motto, Epistolario]
The Biographical Memoirs: Italian [IBM] V, 344; VI, 483 , 544; VIII, 67-71,
530-531; 535, 538, 592-596, 610, 634-636, 679, 688; x, 427ff., 454-459ff.;
475-480; 487-499 (temporalities); 501-506, 526 (press).
Francesco Motto, "Don Bosco mediatore tra Cavour and Antonelli nel 1858,"
Ricerche Storiche Salesiane 5 (1986:1) 3-20 [Motto, DB Mediatore] ; "La
mediazione di Don Bosco fra Santa Sede e Govemo per la concessione degli
<Exequatur> ai vescovi d' ltalia (1872-1874)," Ricerche Storiche Salesiane 6:1
(1987) 3-79 [Motto, La Mediazione]; "L'azione mediatrice di Don Bosco ne!la
questione delle sedi vescovili vacanti dal 1858 alla mone di Pio IX (1878)," in Don
Bosco nella Chiesa a servizio dell'umanita. Studi e cestimonianze, ed. by Pietro
Braido (Roma: LAS, 1987), 251-328 (Motto. L 'Azione].
F. Desramaut, Don Bosco en son temps (1815-1888) (Torino: Societa Editrice
lntemazionale, 1996). Salient passages: 515-519 (Cavour-Pius IX); 690-694
(Vegezzi mission, 1865); 711-713 (Don Bosco in Rome and Prime Minister
Ricasoli's politics); 713-716 (Don Bosco in Rome and the Tonello mission, 1866-
1867); 817-821 (appointments of bishops to vacant sees); 838··841; 860-862;
865-867 (bishops' temporalities) [Desramaut, DB en son temps]; "L'audience
imaginaire ciu ministre Lanza (Florence, 22 juin 1871)," Ricerche Storiche
Salesiane 11:1 (1992) 9-34 [Desramaut, L'Audience]; "Etudes prealables a une
biographie de Saint Jean Bosco," in Cahiers Sa!esiens. Recherches et documents
[... ] 34-35 (April 1995) 13-129 (critical chronology).
Use is also made of current historical works dealing with the period, such as the
following: Christopher Duggan, A Concise History of Italy (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1994) [Duggan, Italy]; D. Beales, The Risorgimento and the
Unification of Italy, new ed. (London: Longman, 1981); D. Mack Smith, The
Making of Italy 1796-1866, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1983); Id., Victor
Emanuel, Cavour and the Risorgimento (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).
Recent Italian works dealing specifically with the subject are: P. Pirri, Pio IX e
Vittorio Emanuele II dal loro carteggio privato. 3 vol. (Roma: Pontificia Universita
Gregoriana); Vol. II (Pans 1 and 2), La questione romana (1856-1864), 1951; Vol.
III (Pans 1 and 2), La questione romana dalla convenzione di settembre al/a caduJa
del potere temporale, con appendice di documenti fino alla mone di Vittorio
Emanuele II (1864-1878), 1961; R. Mori, La questione romana (1861-1865)
(Firenze: Le Monnier, 1963); Id., fl tramonto del potere temporale (1866-1870)
(Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1967).
For basic data and detailed chronology use is made of V. Ceppellini and P.
Boroli (eds), Compact Storia d'Icalia. Cronologia 1815-1990 (Novara: Istituto
Grafico DeAgostini, 1991 [Compact DeAgostini].

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Politics of the "Our Father" and of the Holy Father
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confer on him special power or distinction. How then explain his remarkable
involvement in sensitive Church-state negotiations over many years? One may
best judge the matter after hearing the long and comples story of this
involvement.
At the moment, it is important to understand that Don Bosco was
involved in these negotiations in a completely private capacity. The non-
official status of his mediation explains why one finds but little mention of it
in official documents or secular historical writing. In a comment introducing
his collection, Father Gioachino Berto, Don Bosco' s secretary, offers an
explanation.
At this point in time, few written documents are available that might be used
to show the part which Don Bosco played between the years 1867 and 1874 in
the nomination of bishops to vacant sees and in obtaining for them the so-
called tempora!ities. The reason for such Jack of documentation is that he did
not act in an official capacity. Obviously, the Holy See could not compromise
the pope's dignity by negotiating directly with his enemies. Don Bosco did
indeed act as a bona fide intermediary, but without bearing official credentials.
He dealt with the government in a private capacity and by word of mouth, but
always in accordance with instructions received from the Vatican. Then he
would faithfully report the government's responses and the demands back to
the Vatican.2
Now, however, we find ourselves in a different and much more favorable
position. Both Motto and Desramaut, the two Salesian historians that have
written critically on the subject (to both of whom the present article is
indebted) cite several histories of the period in which Don Bosco's activities are
mentioned. Catholic Church historians are also cited that mention Don Bosco's
mediation, even though not in any great detail. In addition, research in various
archives has produced correspondence and other documentation that sheds
considerable light on Don Bosco's role. This larger body of historical data
lends qualified support to the Salesian claim as embodied in the Biographical
Memoirs.3 It also enables us to describe in some detail Don Bosco's activity as
intermediary.
In this context it should be clearly understood that negotiations
undertaken between the Holy See and the Italian government were never aimed
at a political "reconciliation" between the two contending parties. The idea and
the word was indeed bandied in both the anticlerical and Catholic conservative
2 Berto Collection, in ASC 112 Vescovi, FDB 788 C2. In the next few pages
Berto records eyewitness testimonies of various Salesians who were close to Don
Bosco in those years.
3 Motto, L'Azione, 252, notes 2 and 3. Among the archives consulted, Motto
mentions the Secret Vatican Archive, in its various sections, and the Historical
Archive of the [Italian] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He also mentions a number of
historians, P. Pirri, Roger Aubert, G. Martina, among others.

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Journal of Salesian Studies
press for the purpose of excoriating parties involved in any negotiation. But
the very idea would have appeared preposterous under the circumstances. This
will be apparent from the story that is to follow. As mentioned above, Don
Bosco's mediation through the years of his involvement was chiefly concerned
with the problem of the nomination and appointment of bishops to vacant
dioceses, and with obtaining the Exequatur and the so-called "temporalities" for
them, once appointed. His earliest attested act of mediation (in 1858) concerned
the see of Turin and its exiled archbishop, Luigi Fransoni.
I. Don Bosco's Mediation in 1858
1. The Case of Archbishop Luigi Fransoni of Turin
At Archbishop Colombano Chiaveroti's death in 1831, Bishop Luigi Fransoni
was appointed administrator of the Archdiocese of Turin, and on February 24,
1832, at King Charles Albert's request, its archbishop-a post he held for 30
years until his death in exile in 1862.
The first dozen years of his tenure in the Turin Archdiocese were peaceful
and characterized by good normal relationships with the monarc.hy and the state
authorities. But, even before the liberal revolution and the adoption of a
constitution in 1848, there developed a gradual disaffection in the relationship
leading to opposition and confrontation. In 1844 King Charles Albert
established the Teachers' Normal School at the university, and invited the
noted educator, Father Ferrante Aporti, for a series of lectures on methodology.
The Archbishop declared his opposition to the appomtrnent of this liberal
educator, and forbade the clergy to attend the lectures. In late 11347 Bills on
freedom of the press and of religion were passed. These Bills allowed the
produc.tion and circulation of books and newspapers of various political
tendencies, and granted civil rights and freedom of worship to both the Jews
and to the Waldenses (usually referred to as Protestants). The archbishop
declared his opposition to such liberal legislation, even as Pius IX in Rome
was having the walls of the Jewish ghetto dismantled. The archbishop's
opposition to the liberal movement solidified even more with the revolution of
1848 in France and in the Kingdom of Sardinia, when King Charles Albert
granted a constitution, and the Kingdom of Sardinia became a constitutional
monarchy. There set in a climate of growing euphoria, as the liberal patriots
placed their hopes for the unification of Italy on both King Charles Albert and
Pope Pius IX. Hopes were dashed when Pius IX failed to support the war
waged by Piedmont to win back regions of northern Italy occupied by Austria.
A period of turmoil followed in Rome. The pope was forced to flee the city,
and revolutionaries led by Mazzini established a republic there.
The first people to be affected by the confrontation in Turin were the
seminarians and faculty of the theological school at the University and of the
Seminary. The mounting crisis also affected clergy and Catholic laity deeply,
caught as they were between conflicting allegiances: the just demands of

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Politics of the "Our Father" and of the Holy Father
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citizenship on the one hand, and the archbishop's unyielding opposition to the
constitution and to all political and social reforms.
From l 84g on, the archbishop began to be personally the object of
attacks in the press and of insults in public, He often found himself in physical
danger. In short, he became the symbol of the deep rift that was forming
between the liberal state and the Church. The Archbishop was determined to
stand his ground. But in March 1848, under pressure from many quarters and at
the "request" of the government, he went into "voluntary" exile to Switzerland.
Some two years later, a petition for his return bearing many signatures was
presented to the Minister for Church affairs. Archbishop Fransoni returned to
his diocese on February 26, 1850.
Meanwhile on January 9, 1850, the House of Representatives of the
Kingdom of Sardinia in Turin approved a Bill presented by the Minister of
Justice, Count Giuseppe Siccardi, which abolished some of the ancient
privileges enjoyed by the Church in the kingdom. This Bill did away with the
privilege of separate ecclesiastical courts and of immunity of sacred places, that
is, the right of persons pursued by the police to seek "sanctuary" in churches
and monasteries. In the days that followed, other Bills presented by Minister
Siccardi were passed that further curtailed Church privileges. They provided for
a reduction in the number of established religious festivals, and forbade Church
corporations from acquiring properties or accepting gifts without the state's
authorization. The Siccardi Bills were passed in the senate on April 8, 1850. In
the evening there took place a popular manifestation in Minister Siccardi's
honor that required police intervention. The following day King Victor
Emmanuel II sign~ the Bills into law. On the premise that the old
ecclesiastical order no longer responded to the needs and demands of the new
political and social order of the liberal revolution, these laws had the general
effect ofreducing the Church's power in .civil society.
Church authorities were not slow to react. The Representative of the
Holy See in Turin immediately presented a strong protest and left the city. On
April 2 1, the state police confiscated a circular letter from Fransoni to parish
priests, which was construed as resisting the application of the Siccardi laws.
When summoned to appear in court, the archbishop ignored the summons. He
was arrested, fined, and sentenced to one month in jail. A similar situation
developed in other cities of the kingdom such as Sassari and Cagliari in
Sardinia.
A couple of months later a much more serious episode occurred. On
August 6 (1950), the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, Count Pietro
Derossi di Santarosa, fell gravely ill and at the point of death requested the
Sacraments. As a member of the government he had supported the Siccardi
Bill; hence the Archbishop, on advice from his theologians, demanded a public
recantation. The count refused and was denied the Sacraments. He was not
denied Christian burial, but the funeral turned into a riot. The Archbishop was
accused of abuse of power and of activities against the state. He was arrested,
imprisoned and subsequently condemned to perpetual exile. On September 28,

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Journal of Salesian Studies
1850, he was escorted to the French border. He chose to settle in Lyons, where
he died 12 years later, on March 26, 1862. Through all those years and for
some years thereafter, the Church of Turin remained without a resident bishop.
As noted above, the process of secularization that was part and parcel of
the liberal revolution aimed at abolishing or diminishing the Church's control
in all areas and institutions of society. The secularization of the school, long
under the total control of the Church, was the object of legislation passed in
1848 and again in 1859 and in the 1870s. New penal and civil codes were
introduced after Napoleon's models. But by far the most important and painful
stage of the process was the suppression of religious corporations, especially
of monastic religious communities of both men and women, and the
confiscation of their properties. This was done under the tenns of the Rattazzi
Bill of 1855, known as the "Law of the Convents." All these secularization
laws, at first in force only in the Kingdom of Sardinia, were later extended to
the whole of Italy (united in 1861), including Rome (taken from the pope in
1870).
It was in this context, in connection with the Fransoni case, that Don
Bosco first became involved as go-between in Church-state negotiations.
2. Don Bosco Intermediary between Gustavo and Camillo
Cavour and the Holy See in the Fransoni Case•
Archbishop Fransoni did his best to govern the archdiocese from his exile
through intennediaries. But his absence left a void that could not easily be
filled, and the situation in the Church of Turin deteriorated over the years.
Without demanding it, as far back as 1853-1854 the pope had suggested that
the archbishop resign, so that a resident successor could be named who would
be acceptable both to the liberal government and to the Church. The
archbishop, however, would not budge. By 1858 both Church and government
people felt that something should be done about it. It is at this point that Don
Bosco was asked to act as intennediary in the negotiations between Prime
Minister Carnillo Cavour, through his brother Gustavo, and the Holy See
through Cardinal Antonelli, Secretary of State to Pius IX.
In early 1858 Don Bosco traveled to Rome with Seminarian Michael Rua
acting as his secretary. The object of this Don Bosco's first trip to the eternal
city, apart from some heavy sightseeing, was to consult Pius IX on the
founding of a religious congregation (the Salesian Society). Don Bosco hOO
been in Rome for nearly a month, when he received a long Jetter from Marquis
Gustavo Cavour brother of Prime Minister Carnillo Cavour, asking him to act
as intermediary. In this letter, dated March 13, 1858, Marquis Gustavo made an
important point and offered a proposal. While a comprehensive settlement
between the Piedmontese government and the Holy See was out of the
question, appointing a resident bishop for the see of Turin might be a good
• Motto, DB Mediatore, 3-20. Desramaut, DB en son temps, 515-520.

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Politics of the "Our Father" and of the Holy Father
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start and possibly open the way to further negotiations. Would Don Bosco
approach the Roman authorities with a proposal: "If it would please the Holy
Father to make the[...] revered Archbishop Fransoni a cardinal and appoint an
archbishop as resident coadjutor with right of succession," this would be a
solution acceptable to both sides. In the marquis' j udgment there were a
number of acceptable candidates for the post, for example Bishop Giovanni
Antonio Odone of Susa, Bishop Giovanni Pietro Losana of Biella, the
Vincentian superior Marcantonio Durando, and others.s It may be noted that the
proposal did not demand Archbishop Fransoni's resignation, but only the
appointment of a coadjutor. As will be seen, however, Prime Minister Cavour
expected a voluntary resignation. In any case, it was unlikely that Fransoni
would accept such an accommodation, hence the appointment (were the pope
ever to make it) would practically speaking force his resignation.
In the audience of April 6, Don Bosco presented the letter to Pius IX,
who read it and asked Don Bosco to take it to the Secretary of State, Cardinal
Antonelli. On April 9, Don Bosco wrote to the Cardinal requesting an audience
for the purpose of handing the letter over to him: "I have received a letter from
Turin that I would like Your Eminence to see before I leave Rome."6
From the exchanges that followed it emerges that Don Bosco did hand the
letter over to Cardinal Antonelli, before leaving Rome for Turin,7 but we have
no information regarding their conversation. Likewise, there may have been a
second exchange by letter between Cavour and Don Bosco, followed by a
second consultation in Rome, about which no information is available.8
Back in Turin, Don Bosco made his report to Marquis Gustavo Cavour.
From Rome, by letter of June 12, Cardinal Antonelli directed the
Representative of the Holy See in Turin, Father Gaetano Tortone, to find out
from Don Bosco ("tactfully," delicatamente) how matters stood.9 Don Bosco
was able to reassure him that nothing had changed, and that as a matter of fact
he had already reported to the Holy Father by. letter of June 14. The letter
reveals Don Bosco's caution, as well as his desire to see the matter resolved. It
is worth quoting in its pertinent parts.
s Motto, DB Mediatore, 8.
6 Don Bosco to Cardinal Antonelli, Rome, April 9, 1958, in Motto, Epistolario
I, 348 [from the Secret Vatican Archive].
7 In spite of painstaking research, the original of Cavour's letter could no
longer be found. Motto has it from historians P. Pirri and G. Martina [Motto, DB
Mediatore , 8, note 12).
8 Cf. Motto, DB Mediatore, 9, note 13.
9 Cardinal Antonelli to Father Gaetano Tortone, June 12, 1958. Jn Motto, DB
Mediatore, 14 (from the Secret Vatican Archive).

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Most Holy Father,
Turin, June 14, 1858
Back among my boys, I cannot relate enough of the things heard and seen in
the eternal city, of those things especially that have to do with Your
Holiness. I do so with a profound sense of gratitude toward Your Holiness'
sacred person. [...]
One thing, however, has been a source of heartfelt regret to me after
leaving Rome-not to have had more time at my disposal so that I could come
to see Your Holiness again, since in your kindness Your Holiness had offered
to receive me!0 I believe it was about our archbishop. Be that as it may, I
would again recommend our diocese in its pitiable state to Your Holiness'
good and fatherly heart. I entreat Your Holiness with the words that the
faithful of Lyons of old spoke to St. Eleutherius, your worthy predecessor:
"Most Holy Father, act to bring peace to our Church and help us in our need. "
True, we are not suffering outright persecution and there is no bloodshed, but
evil is rampant and the damage immense. We still have a lot of good people,
but they are oppressed and helpless. Evil people get bolder by the day. The
weak are daily led astray in great numbers. If by the height of misfortune the
heretics were to go to power legally, I have reason to fear that defections
would reach frightening proportions even from the ranks of those who occupy
posts of responsibility in this diocese. I say this in the Lord. May Your
Holiness forgive me.
I don't know if the idea expressed by Mr. de Cavour has anyth\\ng in it' to
commend it to your Holiness. If it were meant to establish a precedent and a
general principle, I would not trust the proposal. But since 1t is meant to deal
with one particular case, I think it holds out some hope of success, especially
since the original good intentions endure. In any case, Your Holiness needs to
act in some way for the good of the Turin diocese, because the evils that would
::esult from inaction would be irreparable. I speak in the Lord.
Rumor has it, and it has also been reported in the press, that Father
[Giovanni Antonio] Genta, pastor of the church of St. Francis de Paola in this
capital city, is about to be named bishop of Asti. I would like to bring to Your
Holiness' attention that he is very much the liege of the government. He has
recently been decorated with the cross of the Order of SS. Maurice and Lazarus
"for his enlightened zeal," the very words of the citation. He is a follower of
Gioberti , and has given indications of supporting the Bill on civil marriage.
( ...)II
10 We have no other information on this offer of an additional audience. It's all
very puzzling, for if the pope wanted to see Don Bosco, would the latter have failed
to respond "for lack of time"?
11 Don Bosco to Pius IX, Turin, June 14, 1858, in Motto, Epistolario I, 352. In
the last paragraph Don Bosco is describing a liberal bishop. There were many
liberals among the clergy, people who saw value in the new political and social
order, especially in the moderate form it had taken in the kingdom of Sardinia.
These people were also "patriotic," that is, they supported the idea of a united Italy.
Vincenzo Gioberti (d. 1852) was one of these priests. At first he advocated a
federated Italy under the presidency of the Pope (Neo-Guelphism); later he joined the

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Politics of the "Our Father" and .of the Holy Father
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A few days later Don Bosco took the ini tiative of sounding out . Marquis
Gustavo Cavour. By letter of June 22 the marquis assured him that his brother
the Prime Minister felt "particularly pleased with the good will that His
Holiness has shown in the matter regarding the archbishop of Turin." Prime
Minister Cavour had also expressed a desire "to have a talk with Don Bosco."12
This decisive meeting took place on June 26, after which Don Bosco presented
Cavour' s position to Delegate Tortone. Cavour agreed with the Holy See on
the need of restoring Archbishop Marongiu to Cagliari (Sardinia) as well as
Bishop Artico to Asti (Piedmont).13 As for Turin, the appointment of Bishop
Odone of Susa would be acceptable. Archbishop Fransoni could return to Turin
provided he would resign voluntarily and the Holy See would guarantee his
resignation. The Prime Minister would speak with the king and later have
another talk with Don Bosco.14
In spite of the early signs of good will, Cavour's position revealed the
gulf that separated the government's policy from that of the Holy See. On July
3, Cardinal Antonelli, pointing out the grave misunderstanding on Cavour's
part, gave a negative reply. The Secretary of State felt that demanding
Fransoni's resignation was a capitulation that would humiliate the episcopate
and establish a dangerous precedent. The Holy Father might concede to the
point of appointing a coadjutor with right of succession, but would go no
farther. 15
In spite of bitter disappointment, Don Bosco promised Delegate Tortone
he would try to see Prime Minister Cavour again and explain the Holy See's
position to him. But Cavour left for France on July 11 for talks with Emperor
Napoleon m. 16 Don Bosco, however, tried to get the conversations restarted.
general liberal and patriotic movement. Don Bosco at first praised him; later he
regarded him as a renegade priest. Among the liberal reforms proposed was that of
"civil marriage," that is, recognizing the validity of marriage contracted before the
civil authority and not before the Church. In 1852 a Bill to that effect was passed i n
the House but was defeated in the Senate.
12 Gaetano Tortone to Cardinal Antonelli, June 23, 1858 (reporting information
from Don Bosco), in Motto, DB Mediatore, 16-17 (from the Secret Vatican
Archive).
13 Archbishop Giovanni Emanuele Marongiu-Nurra like Archbishop Fransoni,
had been expelled from his diocese (Cagliari, Sardinia) in l 850. Bishop Filippo
Artico of Asti had been accused of "immoral conduct" back in 1847, and after a
decade of seeking redress in the courts had finally resigned.
14 Gaetano Tortone to Cardinal Antonelli, June 26, 1858 (reporting information
from Don Bosco), in Motto, DB Mediatore, 17-18 (from the Secret Vatican
Archive).
15 Cardinal Antonelli to Gaetano Tortone, July 3, 1858 in Motto, DB Mediatore,
18 (from the Secret Vatican Archive).
16 These important talks between Napoleon III and Cavour were held at
Plombieres (France) on July 20-21 , 1858. They led to an alliance between France

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Journal of Salesian Studies
On August 4, he wrote to Prime Minister Cavour pleading with him "not to
forget this poor diocese of ours," and declaring himself "ready to do whatever
lies in my power for my country and my religion."17 There was no reply, and
the negotiations came to an end.
Archbishop Fransoni died in exile in 1862, but the Turin diocese
remained vacant until 1867 and the appointment of Archbishop Alessandro
Ottaviano Riccardi dei Conti di Netro. Archbishop Marongiu, mentioned
above, was restored to his diocese of Cagliari (Sardinia) in 1866, in his old
age. It was a good will gesture on the government' s part, as talks for the
appointment of bishops (to be discussed below) were being planned.
II. Don Bosco's Acting As Intermediary in 1859?
In 1859 Don Bosco is reported to have served as go-between in a secret
correspondence between Pius IX and King Victor Emmanuel II. We have this
information solely on the authority of Don Bosco's biographer, Father
Lemoyne. If the report is reliable, one may then inquire into the circumstances
that brought about the exchange.
1. Political Context
Pragmatic Piedmontese politicians led by Cavour, and the moderates of the
Italian National Society, unlike Mazzini's and Garibaldi's republicans, h<rl
realized that the unification of Italy could not be achieved without the support
of a foreign power. Under the ci.!'cumstances the foreign power would have to
be France. In addition, Emperor Napoleon III aspired to extend French influence
to Italy, at the time largely dominated by Austria. The conversations held by
Emperor Napoleon III and Prime Minister Cavour at Plombieres in July 1858
(referred to above) resulted in an alliance and eventually in a joint war against
Austria, the Second War of Italian Independence. A contrived insurrection at
Massa-Carrara offered a pretext, and the war was fought victoriously by the
French and the Piedmontese between April and July 1859. Garibaldi also
fought victoriously against the Austrians in the Alps with a volunteer force,
called the Alpine Hunters, under his own independent command. On July 11,
1859, Napoleon III, contrary to the Plombieres agreement, entered into a secret
pact with Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria, and an armistice was signed.
Piedmont gained only the region of Lombardy. King Victor Emmanuel JI
accepted the terms, but Cavour resigned in angry protest. The king, however,
reluctantly returned him to power on January 21, 1860.
and the Kingdom of Sardinia, to the Second War for independence from Austria
(1859), and to the unification of Italy (186 1).
17 Don Bosco to Carnillo Cavour, August 4, 1858, in Motto, Epistolario I, 357
(from Tunn' s State Archive).

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Under cover of the war, some Italian regional states revolted against their
rulers, elected constitutional assemblies, and requested annexation to Piedmont.
They were the Duchy of Modena, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the Duchy of
Parma, and the Legations of Romagna (Bologna, Ferrara and Ravenna), which
were part of the Papal States. King Victor Emmanuel II had to proceed with
caution and dispatched his court chaplain, FaL'ler Emanuele Stellardi, with a
letter to Rome to plead the cause of the Legations with the pope. Pius IX
received the king's messenger in audiences of September 23 and 29. While the
Stellardi mission was in progress, on September 24, the king received the
representatives of the Legations with sympathy, and spoke in a veiled but
transparent manner of the need for a political change in their region. The pope
responded by expelling the Piedmontese ambassador from Rome, and by a
strongly worded letter of protest. 18
2. Don Bosco Bearer of a Letter from the Pope to the King?
Lemoyne reports that in the autumn of 1859 the Holy Father asked Don Bosco
to deliver to King Victor Emanuel, in strictest secrecy, a letter in his own
hand. 19 Don Bosco succeeded in getting the letter to the king through the good
offices of the king's personal secretary. If Lemoyne's report is factual, then
this incident of Don Bosco's mediation is best located after the Stellardi
mission. The fact that Father Stellardi was the bearer of an official letter to the
king, probably a strongly worcied letter of protest, does not of itself preclude
the possibility of a private message from the pope using Don Bosco as go-
between. It is known that Pius IX and Victor Emmanuel (who was king but
had little power in government) regarded each other with sympathy.
As an intermediate step to annexation, Piedmont appointed a regent for
those regions, though not Prince Eugene of Savoy, whom the Legations and
those regional states had requested (November 6-9).
18 Motto, Epistolario I, 387, footnote, with a reference to P. Pirri 's work. Also,
Compact DeAgostini, 132.
19 As noted above, Don Rosco's biographer, J. B. Lemoyne, is the sole source
for this incident. He carries the story in the Biographical Memoirs [EBM VI, 155-
156] and in Documenti, the work that preceded the Biographical Memoirs
[Documenti VII, 85, FDB 991 D8]. He places this incident under the date April 25
[1859), but the story itself, enriched with dialogue, begins with the words "Some
time this year" (In quest'anno). The king happened to be vacationing or hunting in
the Alps at the time. Chevalier Aghemo, the king's Secretary, was entrusted with
delivering the letter, and the king's reply was brought to Turin by Father Roberto
Murialdo, a court chaplain, and thence conveyed to Pius IX. Documenti VII may
have been compiled in the late 1880s. Lemoyne was Secretary of the general
council of the Salesian Society and had been very close to Don Bosco since 1884.
He had joined Don Bosco as a newly ordained priest in 1864, hence some five years
after the event.

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It was probably under these circumstances that Don Bosco, through a
·trusted friend, addressed a letter to Pope Pius IX. It reads in part:
Most Holy Father, we deeply regret and decisively reject our government's
policies and actions in Romagna. We unfortunately were powerless to prevent
such evil; but through the spoken and written word we have consistently
voiced our disapproval of what has been happening there. Most of the
diocesan clergy, practically all the parish priests, and the majority of
Catholic lay people here share these same sentiments, even though through
fear of reprisal they refrain from public statements. [...]
If I may speak plainly, my fear is that this raging storm will only increase
in force. A government that thrives on revolution frightens me. On the one
hand defections from the ranks of good practicing Catholics are each day more
numerous; on the other the number of the enemies of social order seeking
political asylum here or joining the rebels in Romagna is on the increase. But
my worst fear is that the person of Your Holiness (God forbid!) may have to
suffer even more violent harassment and persecution.20
Don Bosco' s words were prophetic. The process of the liberal revolution and of
the unification of Italy would proceed apace to its inexorable conclusion. Its
ultimate result would be that the Church's life, its institutions and structures
in Italy would be seriously affected.
III. Don Bosco's Involvement at the Time of the Vegezzi
Negotiations for the Appointment of Bishops (March-
June, 1865)
1. Political Developments: The Unification of Italy
The annistice concluded between France and Austria, ending the Second War of
Italian Independence, was finalized by the Peace of Zurich (November l 0,
1859), in which Piedmont played no part. The treaty provided for Lombardy to
be annexed to the Kingdom of Sardinia. and envisaged in general terms a
federation of Italian regional states, with their legitimate rulers restored.
Lombardy was annexed to Piedmont, but otherwise things took a different
turn. Napoleon Ill's true position found expression in the pamphlet Le Pape et
le Congres (The Pope and the Congress). Written by Baron Louis-Etienne de la
Gueronniere but inspired by Napoleon himself, it was published
simultaneously in Paris, London, Frankfurt, Turin and Florence on December
22, 1859. The pamphlet recognized the necessity for the pope to retain
territorial sovereignty, but suggested that "the smaller the territory, the greater
the sovereignty." It also suggested explicitly that the pope might begin by
20 Don Bosco to Pope Pius IX, Turin, November 9, 1859, in Motto, Epistolario
I, 386-387.

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surrendering his rule over the Legations of Romagna. The pamphlet drew the
ire of the Catholic press and a condemnation from Pius IX, who was unaware
of its true authorship.
The pamphlet's implications were clear: the emperor was lending
qualified support to Cavour's program for the unification of Italy, being
apparently committed also to defending the pope's sovereignty. He was also
adroitly furthering French interests. In March 1860, following a referendum,
Tuscany, Parma, Modena and the Legations of Romagna were officially
annexed to Piedmont. In recognition of French support, by a separate accord,
Nice and Savoy (up to that point, June 1960, part of the Kingdom of Sardinia)
were ceded to France.
Following an uprising against the Bourbon government in Palermo
(Sicily), Garibaldi, at the urging of the Action Party leaders, mounted an
expedition to Sicily in support of the revolutionaries. In spite of opposition
from Victor Emmanuel II and Cavour, who regarded his radical republican
commitment as dangerous, he gathered a small volunteer force (the "One
Thousand") and landed in Sicily. In battles fought from Palermo to Naples
between May and October 1860, he defeated the Bourbon forces and overthrew
the monarchy. By this time Garibaldi' s volunteer army had risen to some
S0,000 in number.
Piedmont had to make a preemptive move to take the initiative for the
"liberation ofltaly" away from Garibaldi. Such engagement on Piedmont's part
(with France's acquiescence) would involve entering the Papal States. Thus it
was that the Piedmontese army invaded the Marches and Umbria, where the
movement for annexation had been strong. On September 18, 1860 the
Piedmontese army defeated the papal forces, and led by King Victor Emmanuel
moved on towards Naples. On October 26, Garibaldi met Victor Emmanuel at
Teano. He saw no alternative but to hail Victor as king of Italy, surrender his
"conquest," and dismiss his army.
Referendums were held at Naples and in the Papal States, and the
"conquered" regions were annexed to Piedmont. These actions paved the way
for the proclamation of Victor Emmanuel II as king of united Italy by vote of
the first Italian parliament and senate, and by Jaw of March 17, 1861.
2. Political Developments: the Roman Question
Territorially, Italy was not completely united. On the one hand, the Veneto 300
other areas in the extreme northeast remained under Austria. On the other, the
pope still held Rome and the surrounding territory (Latium). From the point of
view of the Italian Risorgimento the latter question is referred to as the Roman
Question. In Rome, France maintained a garrison for its protection against
possible take-over attempts. The Third War of Italian Independence (1866)
would settle (even though incompletely) the first question. The latter question
(the Roman Question), the more sensitive by far, from this point on became
the most divisive issue in Italian society.

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Journal of Salesian Studies
On March 23 (1861) the first cabinet of the new nation was fonned with
Count Camillo Benso of Cavour as Prime Minister. Since the unification of
Italy was achieved by annexation of Italian regional states to Piedmont, and not
(for example) through federal union, Turin functioned naturally as its first
capital. But the Roman Question, that is, whether Rome should be claimed
from the pope as the historic capital ofltaly, immediately came to the fore. On
March 26-27, in two speeches delivered in Parliament, Cavour presented the
government's position and strategy. The unification of Italy could be regarded
as complete only when Rome became its capital. The "liberation" of Rome,
therefore, must remain the goal, to be pursued with France' s acquiescence. It
must be accomplished without infringing upon the pope's spiritual freedom
and independence, of which Italy must be the guarantor before the world. In
addition, Italy must guarantee to the pope the payment of a yearly sum
comparable to his accustomed revenues. Such a policy would exemplify the
liberal principle, "A free Church in a free state."
Cavour, however, died suddenly on June 6, 1861. In September, Cavour's
successor, Baron Bettino Ricasoli, following Cavour's idea, presented a
proposal of "reconciliation" between Italy and the Holy See to Paris and to
Rome. The Holy See would renounce all territorial sovereignty, in exchange
for the recognitio n of the pope's personal sovereignty, right to diplomatic
representation, and a large yearly endowment (to be underwritten also by other
Catholic nations). The Italian government would pledge not to interfere in the
nomination and appointment of bishops. It would also accept international
control as to the obligations assumed. Ricasoli ' s proposal may have been
"Cavourian,"' but his speeches lacked Cavour' s moderate and reassuring tone.
Thus in his July 1 address in Parliament he said: "We will have Rome not to
destroy but to build up, for we will offer the Church the opp011unity and the
means for self-reformation. We will guarantee freedom and independence for the
Church as the means whereby it may renew itself in that purity of religious
faith, simplicity of life style, austerity of discipline that were the honor and
glory of the papacy in the early days. Such renewal would naturally follow the
willing surrender of that worldly power that is diametrically opposed to the
spiritual nature of the Church's institution."21 Apart from Ricasoli's arguable
notion of the Church, such rhetoric was not likely to encourage dialogue. The
Holy See ignored the overture. France refused to enter into any discussion of
the Roman Question on any terms. As noted above, the government's
ecclesiastical policy, more than its words, aggravated an already tense situation.
For the next 15 years the government remained in the hands of the
moderate liberals of Cavourian stamp (the so-called Historic Right).22 But the
21 Sussidi per lo studio di Don Bosco e della sua opera, I: II tempo di Don Bosco
(Roma: SDB, 1989), 67 [Sussidi I].
22 The governments of the Right after Cavour were ineffectual and came
tumbling down at every crisis, as the mere enumeration of Prime Ministers
suggests. Bettino Ricasoli (June 1861 - March 1862), Urbano Rattazzi (March -

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governments that followed were weak and incapable of dealing with the chaotic
situation that developed throughout the peninsula.
The government adopted a policy of repression and coercion, administered
by army units and police, as a method for dealing with social unrest. This was
especially true for the southern parts of Italy and Sicily, where banditry, the
Mafia, resentment against the "Piedmontese rule" fueled frequent uprisings arrl
required the deployment of as many as 100,000 soldiers.
No less disturbing for the government were the schemes of the radical
Republicans hatched by Mazzini and Garibaldi. The latter had seen fit to ''hand
over" his conquest of the Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies to King
Victor Emmanuel II. But the pure patriots' sights were now focused on Rome
and Venice. On December 16, 1861, the committees that had been formed to
support Garibaldi' s expedition to Sicily in 1860, were re-established in Genoa
and re-named, "Committees for the Liberation of Rome and Venice." Because
of disagreements with Mazzini's faction, Garibaldi refused the leadership. But
when the committees met again (March 9-10. 1862) to form an "Association
for the Liberation of Italy," Garibaldi stifled his personal grudges and accepted
the presidency of the association. Some time later, a band of volunteers
attempting to move against Venice was dispersed by the Italian regular army,
while Mazzini, Garibaldi and other leaders of the Association planned an
expedition against Rome. Garibaldi gathered a small volunteer force in Sicily
with the oath, "Either Rome or Death." The force crossed over into Italy arrl
was met by Italian regulars at Aspromonte. After a brief skirmish, Garibaldi
was wounded in the foot and taken prisoner together with other volunteers
(August 29, 1862). One month later, they were amnestied on the occasion of a
royal wedding.
A further cause of concern for the government was the anger of Pius IX
over the loss of much of his temporal power. The pope' s condemnation of the
new political arrangement, and his efforts to mobilize Catholics in defense of
the Church, were seen as an attempt to undermine the state from within.23 The
ecclesiastical policies of the Liberal Right were a major cause of this state of
alienation. These policies maintained the jurisdictiona!ist position ingrained in
December 1862), Luigi Carlo Farini (December 1862 - March 1863), Marco
Minghetti (March 1863 - September 1864), Alfonso Ferrero La Marmora
(September 1864 - December 1865), La Marmora II (December 1865 - June 1866),
Ricasoli II (June 1866 - April 1867), Rattazzi II (April - October 1867), Luigi
Federico Menabrea (October - December 1867), Menabrea II (January 1868 - May
1869), Menabrea III (May - November 1869), Giovanni Lanza (December 1869 -
June 1873), Minghetti II (last government of the Right, July 1873 - March 18,
1876).
In 1876 the government passed into the hands of the more radical liberal Left
(the so-called Historic Left). These politicians of the Left had their roots i n
Mazzini's republican ideology and the Action Party, and with the years they also
acquired socialist leanings.
23 Cf. Duggan, Italy, 147-152.

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Journal of Salesian Studies
the tradition of the Kingdom of Savoy, and exemplified by the Siccardi and
Rattazzi Laws of 1850 and 1855. The laws of suppression of religious orders
and congregations and of confiscation of their properties were extended to the
whole of Italy between 1864 and 1867. "In 1866-7 2,000 religious
congregations were deprived of legal status and 25,000 ecclesiastical bodies
were suppressed. In the course of the next fifteen years over a million hectares
of church land were sold off."24
The year 1864 marked a turning point in the story of the Roman
Question, as also in Church-state relations in Italy. Garibaldi's triumphal tour
through England in April, his meeting with Mazzini, and talk of Italian
unification in the British press, alerted France and Italy to the danger of a
possible reconciliation of the two "patriots." Hence, in June, conversations on
the Roman Question were held between Emperor Napoleon ill's minister of
foreign affairs and the extraordinary envoy of the Italian government, now
headed by Prime Minister Marco Minghetti. These negotiations led to the
signing on September 15 (1864) of an accord between France and Italy known
as the "September Convention." It provided for the withdrawal by stages of the
French garrison from Rome over a period of two years, thus allowing the Holy
See to draft and train its own army. In exchange the Italian government pledged
to respect the territorial integrity of the city cf Rome and surrounding region,
that is, what was left of the Papal States, and to underwrite a portion of the
Holy See's public debt. A secret clause provided for the transfer of the Italian
capital from Turin to some more central Italian city, as a token of renunciation
of Rome as capital.
The September Convention left the solution of the Roman Question in
limbo. The Italian government understood the provision of respecting thf'c
territorial integrity to mean that tlie pope would voluntarily surrender Rome,
so that armed intervention would not be necessary. It also understood the
transfer of the capital as an interim measure. The French government, on the
contrary, understood the non-aggression clause as binding the Italian
government not to attack, and to control the Garibaldi and Mazzini factions,
which might be tempted by the withdrawal of the French garrison. It also
understood the transfer of the capital to a more important city (other than
Rome) as a valid compromise.
Pope Pius IX obviously mistrusted the provisions of the September
Convention, for he feared that the withdrawal of the French garrison would
invite armed attack. His fears were not ill founded. His concern, however,
transcended the political developments. On December 8, 1864, he published the
encyclical Quanta Cura with the appended Syllabus of Contemporary Errors,
24 Duggan, Italy, 135. Cf. G. Bonfanti, La politica ecclesiastica [... ], quoted in
Sussidi I, 89-90.

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which restated the Church's opposition to all that the liberal revolution stood
for.2s
When the government announced that Florence had ~en chosen as
capital, violent demonstrations in Turin brought the government down, for the
move was perceived as a surrender of Rome as capital. A permanent committee
was established to oppose any government that did not pledge to make Rome
the capical of Italy. But in spite of opposition, on November 19, 1864, the
Italian Parliament in Turin approved the transfer of the capital. The Bill was
passed into law on December 11, 1864, and on February 3, 1865, King Victor
Emmanuel II moved the court to Florence. The depart.ments of government
followed by stages.
National elections were held on October 20, 1865. Only 2% of the
population had the franchise, and only about 54% voted. Moderate liberals won
250 seats, the more radical opposition, 120, and the conservatives, 20. Some
50 seats went to numerous splinter groups. A month later, the king
inaugurated the legislature. By year's end a government was formed with
General Alfonso Ferrero La Marmora as Prime Minister, and Giovanni Lanza
as minister of interior. It was at this juncture that Don Bosco became
tangentially involved in negotiations aiming at filling vacant episcopal sees.
25 With the encyclical Quanta cura Pius IX put the finishing touch on an intense
doc!rinaJ and disciplinary program the purpose of which was to reaffirm the
Church's authority in aJI areas of contemporary society. The Syllabus of
Contemporary Errors was an intransigent condemnation of the "most pernicious
errors" of the liberal revolution. With its 80 propositions or articles the Syllabus
condemned rationalism as a tendency of the human spirit to reject the authority of
revelation and of the Church's teaching. It condemned laicism as eliminating the
Church's influence on social life. It condemned moral and religious indifferentism
as affirming individual right over the right of truth. The Syllabus maintained that
socialist ideas subverted the natural right to private property, and that the
democratic principle of the "will of the people" violated the divine right of the
monarchy. According to the Syllabus the state had the duty not only of governing
secular life but also of safeguarding the rights of the Church. Its condemnations
extended to liberty of conscience, religious tolerance, the lay character of the
school, scientific progress, and freedom of thought, of the press, and of critical
research. The last article condemned aJl Catholic liberalism as wishing to reconcile
the Church's teaching with liberal modem culture. On the one hand, the Syllabus
was received with pride . and joy by conservative Catholics; on the other, it
polarized anticlerical reaction from both liberal and more radical democratic circles.
Understood in a purely religious concext, the Syllabus could be read as a theological
statement to Catholics. Under the circumstances, however, it was widely taken as a
political manifesto.

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3. Don Bosco and the Mission of Negotiator Saverio Vegezzi2'
(1) The Problem of Vacant Sees
One very serious and damaging effect of the confrontation between Church and
State during and after unification was the fact that many bishops were removed
from their dioceses, and that the government opposed the nomination of new
bishops to fill the vacancies. The reason for such punishing policy is to be
sought in the fact that bishops protested against what they perceived to be the
government's unjust and unwarranted public policies, and that the government
was not disposed to allow dissent or resistance. The takeover of papal
territories was not the only reason for the protest. The policies against the
Church in effect since 1848, and now being extended to the kingdom, were
responsible to an even greater extent for the souring of relations. Such were,
for example: the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Kingdom of Sardinia, the
abolition of the Church's privileges, the gradual laicization of public
education, the Bills on civil marriage,27 the suppression of religious
corporations, the confiscation of property and assets of ecclesiastical and
religious bodies, the infiltration of Freemasonry in civil society, the unilateral
imposition of laws unfavorable to religion, etc. These werl! the chief reasons
for the bishops ' protest, as they also were the reasons for Pius IX's
condemnation.
111e situation was critical if not desperate. According to one historian, in
the process of annexation and unification bishops and other clergy in large
north Italian cities, such as Milan, Bergamo and Brescia, were investigated,
harassed, and some times expelled. In central Italy, over a dozen important
cardinals, archbishops, and bishops were imprisoned, expelled, deported, or
placed under house arrest. In southern Italy more than 60 bishops met with the
same fate.28 According to another historian, after the unification of Italy, 13
bishops were brought to trial, though eventually acquitted, and 5 bishops were
taken from their dioceses and imprisoned in Turin. By 1865, 43 bishops had
been exiled, and 16 bishops had died, and no successor had been appointed. In
summary, 24 (of a total of 44) archdioceses, and 84 (of a total of 183) dioceses
26 Cf. Motto, L 'azione mediatrice, 262-275.
27 First proposed in 1850, in 1852 the law on civil marriage (that is, making
marriage a civil insti tution, and removing it from the Church's jurisdiction) was
passed by the lower house in Piedmont, but defeated in the senate. On April 2, 1865
the new civil code (based on the Napoleonic Code) was promulgated, to go in effect
all over Italy on January 1, 1866. The institution of civil marriage, fiercely
opposed by the Church and related organizations in Italy, was among its
provisions. Motto [L 'azione mediatrice, 264) points out that civil marriage had
already been adopted in countries that maintained amicable relations with the Holy
See.
28 D. Masse, Jl caso di coscienza def Risorgimento italiano, 342-343, in Sussidi
I, 86. Cf. also EBM VI, 503, 303-304, 416.

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were deprived of their pastors.29 In a number of cases, new bishops nominated
by the pope were prevented from talcing pos:;ession of their diocese. For
example, in the consistory of December 21, 1863, the pope had nominated new
bishops for Bologna and six other dioceses in that part of the former Papal
States. The government, however, had refused recognition on the ground that
such nominations constituted an act of sovereignty in territories no longer
subject to the pope. Don Bosco was especially concerned with the situation in
Piedmont, where eight of eleven dioceses, including Turin, were vacant. In
Sardinia Archbishop Marongiu of Cagliari had been in exile for the past 14
years.Jo
In the summer of 1864, Pius IX is reported to have invited King Victor
Emmanuel II to open negotiations aimed at alleviating this religious crisis.J 1
However, the September Convention (rejected by the pope), the condemnations
in Quanta cura and the Syllabus, and the rigid conservatism of curia circles and
the clerical press stymied any progress. Nonetheless Pius IX, even though
"reconciliation" was out of the question, was personally inclined to seek some
kind of rapprochement, and thought the moment favorable for a solution of the
question of vacant dioceses. The Minghetti government (1863-1 864), in spite
of some backsliding appeared to have acted more temperately than its
predecessors.
(2) Don Bosco' s Involvement
Don Bosco was in touch with his good friend Father Emiliano Manacorda, who
was at the time serving as domestic prelate at the Vatican and could have access
to "inside information." Biographer Lemoyne tells us that at this time Don
Bosco addressed letters to the pope through Father Manacorda.J2 Don Bosco
may have learned of Pius IX's desire to seek a solution to the crisis of vacant
dioceses. Don Bosco was personally acquainted with people in the government.
29 L' Unita Cattolica of April 4, 1865, in Motto, L'azione mediatrice, 264, data
confinned by the instructions given to negotiator Vegezzi.
Jo Motto, L'azione mediatrice, 264; Desramaut, DB en son temps, 691. The 8
vacant dioceses in Piedmont were: Alba from 1853, Alessandria from 1854, Aosta
and Asti from 1859, Fossano from 1852, Vigevano from 1859, Turin from 1862
(Archbishop Fransoni in exile since 1850), Saluzzo from 1864, Cuneo from March
1865) [Motto, L'azione mediatrice, 268 and note 27, citing Civilra Cattolica XVI
(1864:6) 373].
Ji Motto, L'azione, 265, citing Pirri.
32 Lemoyne, EBM VIII, 44. This is confinned by Father Manacorda's letters to
Don Bosco, seven of which are preserved in the Central Salesian Archive [ASC
126.2 Lettere a DB, Manacorda, FDB 1543 A9 - C2], specifically the letter of
October 8, 1864 [FDB 1543 Al2]. Manacorda's role is discussed in detail by Motto,
L'azione mediatrice, 266-268. Before his appointment (at Don Bosco' s suggestion)
as bishop to the diocese of Fossano (Piedmont) he was Don Bosco's "Man in
Rome."

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He had corresponded with both Prime Minister Alfonso La Marmora and
Minister of the Interior Giovanni Lanza.33 It would not have been difficult for
Don Bosco to ascertain the government's willingness to deal. Don Bosco then
would have stood ready to offer his services. But this is conjecture.
In any case, it was Pius IX himself who in a second letter to Victor
Emmanuel II, dated March 6, 1865, expressed his willingness to settle the
matter. Referring to the government's rejection of earlier nominees, the pope's
letter read in part:
The most serious difficulty in my view is to reach an agreement in the choice
of nominees. The policies of Your Majesty's government are so hostile to the
Church that, when I agree to negotiate, your government presents candidates
that I could not accept. Accordingly, as I told the [French] ambassador, I
suggest that Your Majesty send [to Rome] a person who enjoys your trust. As
far as I am concerned, I would prefer a good and honest lay person to a priest
of dubious character. [.. .] Please, I beg you, do all that lies in your power to
dry some of the tears of the Church in Italy, so tormented and made the object
of so much undeserved hostility.34
The king submitted the pope's letter to his government, and a heated debate
ensued. For there were ministers who resisted any concession, in fact, any
rapprochement on any basis, to the Holy See. But the upshot was that
Giovanni Lanza's Ministry of Interior began to look into the matter. At this
point (March 17, 1865) Don Bosco received a note from a government official
named Veglio, inviting him to a corJerence.35 Mr. Veglio's position in the
government (presumably in Minister Lanza's office) cam.ot be ascertained, but
Don Bosco must have kept the appointment. The content of the conversation
33 Cf. Don Bosco 's letters to La Marmora in 1852, 1856, and 1858 [Motto
Epistolario I, 144, 302, 362-363]. In a letter of August 9, 1865 to Minister of
Interior Lanza [Motto, Epistolario II, 155] Don Bosco offers to give shelter to
some 100 cholera orphans. With an earlier letter of June 12, 1860 to the Minister
of Education, Don Bosco enclosed a letter from Minister Lanza written in support of
the Oratory school [Motto, Epistolario I, 409].
34 Motto, L'azione mediatrice, 269-270, citing original in the Secret Vatican
Archive.
3s Motto [L 'azione mediatrice, 270] speaks of an invitation "by telegram."
However, the original in ASC 126.2 Lettere a DB-Veglio, FDB 1,587 B3, does not
have a telegram format. Nor does it bear the heading, "Ministry of the Interior," as
Lemoyne both in Documenti and in Biographical Memoirs (followed by Motto)
would have it [Documenti IX, 170; EBM VIII, 44]. The invitation reads: ''Turin,
March 17, 1865. By order of the Minister, the undersigned requests a conference
with you, Reverend and Most Esteemed Father. If you can oblige, please come to see
me at your convenience during office hours. Very truly yours, Veglio." It should be
borne in mind that, although the capital had by this time been transferred to
Florence officially (February 3, 1865), government departments were still
operating in Turin.

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with Veglio and/or with Minister Lanza can only be conjectured. In this regard,
it should be borne in mind that nomination of bishops to vacant sees was the
sole matter under advisement Hence, Don Bosco may have made the point
that, if the Cavourian principle, "A free Church in a free State," and the terms
of the September Convention were not to remain dead letter, on purely
religious grounds the Holy See should have the freedom to nominate bishops.
Chevalier Saverio Vegezzi, "a gentleman of noblest character," was
appointed negotiator. This gentleman left for Rome on April 6 bearing a letter
from the king to the pope, with instructions " to find ways of reaching an
agreement in the matter of the nomination of bishops to vacant sees."36
The first round of talks between Vegezzi and Secretary of State Cardinal
Antonelli gave promise of success. A letter of Don Bosco to Pius IX refers to
the negotiations in a fairly up-beat tone. It reads in part:
Most Holy Father, our community has been offering prayers morning and
evening begging God to be with you as you try to repair the grave damage
already done to the Church, and increasing in gravity with any delay in
settling the matter. I am referring to the restoration and nomination of
bishops. The world is awaiting with trepidation the result of the Holy Father's
efforts. But there is hope and comfort In the thought that, when the Pope is
involved, the outcome will be for the best and for the greater good of the
faith ful. 37
Don Bosco's prayers were not to be answered at this time. As mentioned
above, there were within the government those who opposed negotiations with
the Holy See for any reason. On the popular front, the radical press on the one
hand, and the conservative Catholic press on the other, looked upon
negotiations as capitulation to the enemy. Furthermore, the royal house of
Savoy, and hence its government, still clung to jurisdictional positions in their
ecclesiastical policy. For example, they still insisted on the oath of fealty to
the king and on the Exequatu?8 These reasons account for the fact that the
negotiations were conducted in total secrecy, as also for the fact that they were
36 Victor Emmanuel II to Pius IX, Turin, April 4, 1865, in Desramaut, DB en son
temps, 693, citing Pirri, Pio IX. Saverio Vegezzi (1805-1888) a trial lawyer in
Turin, had held a seat in the Piedmontese senate since the 1840s and had served as
finance minister in the third Cavour cabinet (1860).
37 Don Bosco to Pius IX, April 30. 1965, in Motto, Epistolario II, 129.
31 The royal Exequatur was a permit signed by the king and issued to the bishop
upon presentation of the Bull (or Bulls) of appointment. It entitled the bishop to
exercise jurisdiction in the diocese and to enter into possession of premises and
receive revenues. The Bull of Appointment (Latin, Bulla) was a protocol sent out
from the Holy See' s department of protocol (Dataria apostolica) that certified the
bishop 's appointment. Different kinds of Bulls were released. The Bull ad populum
was addressed to the people of the diocese; the Bull ad clerum was addressed to the
clergy; the Bull ad capitulum was addressed to the cathedral chapter; and a Bull ai
episcopum was addressed to the bishop himself.

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Journal of Salesian Studies
ultimately doomed to failure. A letter from Minister Lanza to Paolo Onorato
Vigliani (later minister of justice and a correspondent with Don Bosco in the
matter of the Exequaturs) clearly reveals the mood within the government.
Many people in government have held the position that the annexation of
Rome is to be effected only by peaceful negotiations with the pope, in
accordance with the principle of a Free Church, and with France's agreement.
Now those very same people are attacking the government for accepting to
negotiate in matters that are after all purely religious in nature. [...] I'm afraid
that this attitude of hostility and diffidence within the Cabinet will prevail,
and that as a consequence the negotiations will fail. [...] These ministers still
insist on the bishop's oath of fealty to the king, an outworn and useless
heirloom, in my judgment. I can' t imagine the pope accepting to negotiate on
these terms. Therefore with such a condition the government would
automatically show its unwillingness to come to reasonable and possible
agreements. 39
Vegezzi returned to Rome in June for another round of talks, but apparently
with new instructions dictated by the opposition and contrary to Minister
Lanza' sentiments. As Lanza had predicted,
The negotiations that had made a promising start with Cardinal Antonelli
failed in the end when Pius IX refused to accept the conditions laid down by
the Piedmontese government-namely, that the bishops nominated by the
pope should take the oath of fealty to the k.ing.40
The fealty oath was perceived as implying recognition of the legitimacy of the
Kingdom of Italy. The "intransigence," therefore was reciprocal.
Don Bosco's involvement in the exchanges that go under the name of
"Vegezzi Mission" seems to have been minimal, Though always concerned
with, and perhaps abreast of developments, he seems to have had no further
direct involvement after the exchange with the Lanza office in Turin.
New efforts were made to get the conversations back on course. But
neither Prime Minister Lamarmora's expressions of good will, nor Cardinal
Antonelli's appeal to Napoleon III, nor encouragement from France and from
the moderate press were of any avail. Two more years would elapse before a
new beginning could be made and some results obtained.
IV. Don Bosco and the Tonello Negotiations for the
Appointment of Bishops to Vacant Sees (December 1,
1866-June 1867)
39 C. M. De Vecchi di Val Cismon, le carte di Giovanni Lanza, cited in Motto,
L 'azione mediatrice, 273.
40 "Vegezzi, Saverio," in Enciclopedia Italiana (Treccani) XXXV, 7-8.

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1. Political Developments: Italy's Third War of Independence
Against Austria and Garibaldi's Military Exploit Against
Rome
Early in the year 1866 political relations between Austria and Prussia
deteriorated to the point that war seemed imminent. Prussian Chancellor Otto
von Bismarck coaxed Italy into a military alliance by offering Italy the
prospect of freeing the regions still subject to Austria. Prussia declared war on
Austria on June 17 and Italy on June 20. This is reckoned as the Third War of
Italian Independence. In the battle of Sadowa (Bohemia, July 3)) Austria
suffered a decisive defeat. At the same time Italian regulars fo ught successfully
in the Veneto region, while Garibaldi and his volunteers defeated the Austrians
in the Alps. The Italian fleet, however, suffered total defeat by a much superior
Austrian fleet off the island of Lissa. After Sadowa Austria asked Napoleon III
to mediate an armistice. Without Italy's knowledge (contrary to the terms of
the military alliance) the armistice was signed by Austria and Prussia, and Italy
was forced to follow suit. Garibaldi was ordered to cease hostilities. By the
treaties of peace of August 3 and October 3, Austria ceded Venice and the
Veneto region to Italy, but not other territ0ries claimed by Italy in the extreme
northeast.
At the height of the war, on July 7, 1866, the Italian government passed
a law denying juridical recognition to (hence, suppressing) the remaining
religious orders and congregations and providing for the confiscation of their
property. (The Bill had been presented in Parliament by Francesco Crispi at the
beginning of 1865.) The law also provided for paying into the state's trust fund
for the upkeep of religious worship 5% of the revenues. The buildings of
suppressed monasteries and convents were made available to local arrl
provincial systems for schools, kindergartens, hospitals and charitable
institutions. Confiscated books and works of art were assigned to public
libraries and museums. The confiscation law of 1866 merely made universally
binding what had been done in the Kingdom of Sardinia by the Rattazzi law of
1855, which (as noted above) had already been extended to regional states upon
annexation. It is also worth noting that extending Piedmontese law arrl
administrative systems to regional states and finally to the whole of Italy was
in line with the principle of "unification by annexation." Then, in accordance
with the tenns of the September Convention, the French garrison completed
its withdrawal from Rome, begun in early November 1865. The last
contingent left Rome in October 1866, leaving the city poorly defended by the
papal troops.
This situation is reflected in Pius !X' s Allocution of October 29, 1866.
Understandably, the pope denounced in the strongest terms the "unjust arrl
iniquitous acts" perpetrated by the Italian government against the Church. Then
(not so understandably), he went on to affirm the absolute necessity of the
pope's temporal power to guarantee his complete freedom in the exercise of his

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Journal of Salesian Studies
pastoral office. He added as a final salvo that in the event of a take-over of the
city by Italy, he would not hesitate to go into voluntary exile.
Deprived of French protection, Rome was inviting attack. In March
1867, Garibaldi escaped from his retreat on the island of Caprera and began to
rally volunteers for a military expedition against Rome. In September he was
arrested and imprisoned, but was quickly returned to Caprera following
widespread popular protests. In October an ultimatum from the French
government demanded that Italy stop Garibaldi and his volunteers. Tne French
then initiated the deployment of a new garrison to be stationed near Rome for
the protection of the city and the pope.
And yet all the while, in spite of such hostile moves and countermoves,
initiatives were afoot to restart negotiations to fill the vacant episcopal sees,
for the urgency of settling this matter for the good of the people was widely
felt.
2. The Mission of Negotiator Michelangelo Tonello in the
Government of Prime Minister Ricasoli and Don Bosco's
Involvement (December, 1866 - March 1867).
With Italy's declaration of war against Aus!ria on June 20, 1866, Prime
Minister General 1-1.lfonso La Marrnora had resigned to take command of the
armed forces at the front. He was immediately replaced by Count Bettino
Ricasoli. La Marmora had already sought to clear the ~ir by permitting, on
former Mediator Vegezzi's recommendation, the return of aging Archbishop
Marongiu to his diocese (Cagliari). Ricasoli began to look for ways to addres.<.
the thorny question of bishops' !lominations. His letters show a sincere desire
to permit "the peaceable return of so many bishops to their dioceses and of so
many pastors to their parishes," and speak of his resolve to work toward that
goal.41 A signal from the Holy See was needed, and it caine when Pius IX let it
be known in Florence that he would "gladly receive any person sent [by the
Italian government] to discuss religious issues outstanding.'"2
41 Motto, L'Azione mediatrice, 277-178, citing edition of Ricasoli's letters and
papers. Ricasoli believed that solving the problem of vacant dioceses would not
solve the Roman Question, but would be a good step toward its solution [Ibid.]. He
was wrong. The Holy See always maintained that filling vacant dioceses was a
purely religious question to be addressed for the spiritual good of the people. People
in government, even the better disposed, tended to politicize the issue. Pius IX had
often offered to settle purely religious questions by negotiation. But, as the
Allocution made clear, he was by no means disposed to accept some new political
arrangement for Rome and what remained of the Papal States.
42 Motto, L 'Azione mediatrice, 278, citing various authors.

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(1) The Tonello Mission and the Mood of the Talks
On December 1, 1866, tht; Italian government dispatched to Rome its
representative in the person of Professor Michelangelo Tonello, accompanied
by an aide and bearing a letter of introduction to Pius IX from King Victor
Emmanuel.
The mission was by no means off to an easy start. One should again
recall that it took place while the law of suppression of religious corporations
was being put into effect all over Italy, though Ricasoli sought to soften the
application of its harsher provisions. The take-over of most of the Papal States
(regarded as a "usurpation") and the fear of a "forcible" solution of the Roman
Question (the last contingent of the French garrison was preparing to decamp
at that point in time) were not apt to inspire confidence in Rome. Adding to
this uncertainty was the fact that the talks started with mutual recriminations
for the failure of the earlier Vegezzi mission. Also, Representative Tonello Im
not been properly accredited ·to the Holy See and could not be regarded as
officially delegated. Nevertheless, in spite of these initial obstacles, the gravity
and urgency of matter on the agenda prevailed. And as a matter of fact, looking
back over the course of the negotiations, one could discern a new mood at
work. Some examples of the new "spirit of collaboration" will suffice. The
government had itself seen the necessity of allowing "bishops to return to their
dioceses and pastors to their parishes." As talks progressed the government
would be ready to modify its position to a considerable degree. Thus, even
though "as representative of the laity" it still claimed the right to present
candidates for epis:::opal nomination, it would no longer do so formally, at least
for what concerned the dioceses of the former Papal States. It would be willing
to forgo the political oath of allegiance from the bishops. It would require the
· Exequa.tur only insofar as it pertained to the "temporalities," and not, for
example, to the bishop's ecclesiastical jurisdiction. It would no longer demand
the reduction in the number of dioceses as a condition, even though it still
believed in its necessity. And finally, even though the government would not
yield in the matter of the suppression of religious corporations and the
confiscation of their assets (a matter regarded as demanded by the new social
order), Tonello could assure Cardinal Antonelli that the government would
exercise "moderation."
(2) Don Bosco's Involvement in Florence
How did Don Bosco become involved? From letters to Countess and Count
Uguccioni of Florence we learn that Don Bosco was keeping abreast of
developments. He speaks of good news, namely, the "restoration of bishops
and pastors to their dioceses and parishes," the very words of Ricasoli' s
proposal. Hence it appears that, even before the Tonello mission, Don Bosco
had information regarding the upcoming talks. A few days after Tonello's
appointment, Don Bosco left for Florence, the capital, where he arrived on

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Journal of Salesian Studies
December 11 or 12 and lodged with the archbishop.'3 Father Berto, Don
Bosco's secretary, claims that Don Bosco went to Florence at Prime Minister
Ricasoli's request.
In 1867 [Prime] Minister Ricasoli summoned Don Bosco to Florence with the
object of getting him to approach the pope in a private capacity in the matter
of the bishops' nomination. In Italy at the time, over fifty diocesan sees were
vacant. Don Bosco himself had written to the [Prime] Minister asking him to
take steps to remove the cause of so much grief."
This may be pure inference on Father Berte's part as he collected testimonies
of Don Bosco's involvement at a later date. The Biographical Memoirs, on the
other hand, at this point simply record the agenda Don Bosco had set forth for
his trip to Florence. Besides obligatory visits to illustrious friends and
benefactors and various other engagements, this included calls at no less than
four government ministries or departments: Interior, Finances, Public Works
and Justice, all on Congregation business.' 5
Don Bosco' s sojourn in Florence lasted one busy week, from Tuesday,
December 11 to Tuesday December 18, 1866. From Florence he left for
Bologna and Turin. ' 6
According to the main (printed) text of Lemoyne's Docunzenti (the
forerunner of the Biographical Memoirs) from Bologna Don Bosco is said to
have briefly returned t0 Florence in response to an invitation from Prime
Minister Ricasoli.
It appears that from here [Bologna] Don Bosco, invited by Ricasoli, went
[back?] to Florence for a very brief visit. [The Prime Minister} was eager to
engage his support of Comm. Tonelli [sic], as the latter was negotiating
various matters with the Holy See.'7
A later (undated) marginal note in Lemoyne's hand at the same place in
Documenti explains:
3
•
Don
Bosco
to
Countess
Gerolama
Uguccioni,
Turin,
July
20,
and
to
Chevalier
Tommaso Uguccioni Gherardi, Turin, September 28, 1866 [Motto, Epistolario II,
275 and 299). Like several other Florentine families, the Uguccioni-Gherardis were
Don Bosco's good friends and benefactors.
••Berto Collection in ASC 112, FDB 788 C2.
5
•
Don Bosco's undated
holograph
is
in
ASC
132
Promemorie,
FDB
744
C5-6.
Cf. IBM VIII, 539 (omitted in EBM).
46 Don Bosco's letter to Oblate Maria Maddalena Galeffi is dated Florence,
December 18, 1866 [Motto, Epistolario II, 317). Letters to Father Bonetti and
Father Rua are dated Bologna, December 19, 1866. He writes: "Arrived at Bologna,
this evening I shall be in Guastalla, tomorrow night in Turin."
' 7 Documenti X, 89-90 (printed text), in ASC 110 Cronacheue, FDB 1,004Cl1-
12.

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This is how it was. On hearing that Don Bosco was in Florence and desiring to
speak with him, Ricasoli, who was minister at the time, invited him to call a<
the government palace. He wanted to engage his help in the negotiatior.s fo r
the nomination of bishops, for he knew that Don Bosco was on familiar terms
with Pius IX. Don Bosco went [to the palace] and as he stepped into the office
he told the minister, " I think Your Excellency knows who Don Bosco is-that
I am first and foremost a Catholic." "Yes, yes," the minister replied, "We
know that Don Bosco is more Catholic than the pope himself." The minister
explained what his purpose was and begged him to get in touch with Comm.
Tonelli, [sic] who was the [government's] negotiator in Rome.48
In the Biographical Memoirs Lemoyne greatly expands the marginal note of
Documenti on the basis of a "confidential report" later made by Don Bosco to a
canon of the cathedral, Lemoyne himself being present (so he claims).'9 The
story makes the following points. (1) Immediately Don Bosco warned the
Prime Minister that he would honor his commitments as a Catholic priest in
all circumstances. He is quoted as saying, "Your Excellency, I want you to
know that Don Bosco is a priest at the altar, a priest in the confessional, and a
priest among his boys. He is a priest in Turin and a priest in Florence, a priest
in the house of the poor and a priest in the palace of the king !" (2) Don Bosco,
at the Prime Minister's request, accepted to facilitate in a private capacity the
Tonello negotiations in Rome. But (3) he added that the government should
not object to the pope's choice of bishops, and Ricasoli agreed. (4) At this
point Ricasoli was called to an inner conference room where the cabinet was
meeting under the presidency of the king himself (!) (5) After a long while, he
returned to convey the government' s agreement. But (6) he OOded that the
government would like to see the number of smaller dioceses reduced. To this
Don Bosco replied that he had neither the authority nor the desire to offer such
a suggestion to the pope, and that with such a condition he would have to
withdraw altogether. (7) There was a few moments' break in the conversation
during which the Prime Minister went in again to consult the cabinet on the
issue, and quickly returned to reassure Don Bosco. (8) The conversation ended
with the Prime Minister's plea that Don Bosco would meet with negotiator
Tonello in Rome and lend his support.
Given the special "literary genre" of such story-reports one may question
details, particularly the dialogue.50 This appears to be the case especially if the
story is compared with the marginal note of Documenti (quoted above). But, in
spite of uncertainty with regard to itinerary and chronological sequence, there
seems to be no reason for us to doubt that while in Florence Don Bosco met
with Prime Minister Ricasoli at the latter's invitation. As for the burden or
upshot of the conversation, though we remain in the realm of conjecture, it
48 Documenti X, 90 (hand-written marginal note), in FDB 1,004 Cl 2.
49 Cf. IBM VIII , 533-535; EBM VIII, 239-240.
so So Motto, L'azione mediatrice, 281, Note 64.

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Journal of Salesian Studies
may be inferred that the Prime Minister did ask Don Bosco to help with the
negotiations, and that Don Bosco accepted.s1
(3) Don Bosco's In volvement with Tonello in Rome
Meanwhile negotiations in Rome had gotten under way. Professor Tonello and
Cardinal Secretary of State Antonelli had presented their respective positions
and had explored the more difficult issues standing in the way of an agreement.
The Holy See would easily accept a negotiated arrangement for nominations to
sees within the former Kingdom of Sardinia. But it would not negotiate on
nominations in other annexed regions. In this respect the territories of the
former Papal States presented the greatest difficulty, for the Holy See did not
recognize the Italian government's authority there. Hence for episcopal
nominations to dioceses within the former Papal States the Holy See rejected
any demands by the government especially in the matter of the presentation of
candidates and of the bishops' political oath.s2 It appears that in early January
the talk had reached something like a stalemate on these very issues.
It is at this point (so it seems) that, :iccording to the Biographical
Memoirs, Don Bosco comes on the scene. From Turin Don Bosco left for
Rome on January 7 with Father Giovanni Battista Francesia acting as his
secretary. Their stay in the ete~al city would be prolonged till March 2, 1867.
Business of the Congr;!gation had been the main purpose of the trip. Don
Bosco was seeking the approval of the Salesian Society (as it turned out
without success). Now he was also involved in the Tonello negotiations- to
what extent being mat~er of dispute. Lemoyne describes Don Bosco's Roman
activities in detail.53 He relies on the reports by Father Francesia. These consist
of letters that Francesia addressed to various Salesians and of a memoir that he
wrote at a much later date. The reliability of Francesia's reports is again a
matter of dispute.s•
si Desramaut is more skeptical. He regards the meeting itself as at least
probable. But "we are in the dark as to the content of the conversation, particularly
as to what extent the Tonello mission was discussed." Furthermore, the challenging
statement "on being a priest," while perfectly true, is regarded as spurious as
ascribed to Don Bosco in the Biographical Memoirs [DB en son temps, 7 13-714].
s2 Cf. Motto, L 'azione mediatrice, 28 1-282.
53 IBM VIII, 592-636 and (more succinctly) in EBM 258-280.
s• Father Francesia's letters have come down to us only in copy and not even in
their entirety. His memoir [G. B. Francesia, Due mesi con Don Bosco a Roma.
(Torino: Libreria Salesiana, 1904)] was written some 37 years after the events.
Then. one should bear in mind that by force of circumstances Francesia was in no
way a participant in anything that concerned the negotiations. He was in fact left in
practical isolation throughout the Roman sojourn. The talks were conducted in
strictest secrecy; not a word was leaked to the press. Furthermore, Francesia was a
poet endowed with a nai've but vivid imagination. All these factors tend to weaken
the force of his testimony [Cf. Desramaut, DB en son temps, 742, Note 20].

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To what extent was Don Bosco involved with Tonello in Rome? A Jetter
from Father Francesia written IO days after their arrival in Rome, suggests that
Don Bosco was quickly involved. He writes:
In two separate audiences Don Bosco held lengthy discussions with Cardinal
Antonelli. He was able to smooth out a number of difficult issues of a political
nature, and bring about an understanding on very weighty matters. He met
with Tonello who received him most amiably and told him he was welcome
any time he thought it helpful.ss
Obviously, Don Bosco met with Pius IX in the first place. In the dramatic
interpretation of the Biographical Memoirs , Don Bosco advises Pius IX not to
make any distinction between the various regions of Italy in the matter of the
bishop's nomination. Let both the government and the Holy See present their
list of candidates. Then let the pope choose those candidates that are acceptable
to both sides, and Jet him begin with those dioceses in which the need is most
pressing. Lemoyne comments:
Pius IX accepted Don Bosco's advice and empowered him to negotiate with
Comm. Tonello, reserving all decisions to himself. As a fi rst step, Don
Bosco contacted Cardinal Antonelli and with some difficulty brought him
round to his poim of view, a point of view that was religious in the strict
sense rather than political. He then called on Tonello who had received a
telegram from Ricasoli that read, ''Try to reach an understanding with Don
Bosco." The Commendatore, who was no enemy of the Church, was easily
won over and promised not to place any obstacles in the way of the bishops '
nomination in spite of Ricasoli's exacting instructions. i 6
In the process (so the story continues) Don Bosco had to shuttle back and forth
between the negotiators and the Pope till an agreement was reached. According
to the Biographical Memoirs, therefore, Don Bosco's involvement was a major
one, for he appears invested outright as mediator and referee !
However, Lemoyne' s construction has been called into question. As
indicated above, Francesia' s testimony, on which Lemoyne's story is based, is
weakened by numerous critical considerations.s7 Furthermore, the Ricasoli
telegram (mentioned in the passage just quoted) instructing Mediator Tonello
to get in touch with Don Bosco has been regarded as a later inference by
Lemoyne. Neither the original nor copies of the original are extant. Neither
Francesia, nor Documenti make any mention of it.ss
Motto admits that the extent and the precise contribution of Don Bosco's
mediation cannot be determined. But he credits Francesia' s (and Lemoyne's)
is IBM VIII, 596 (omitted in EBM) .
s6 IBM VIII, 594-595, and (inaccurately translated) EBM VIII, 259-260.
s7 Cf. Note 54 and related text above.
ss Desramaut, DB en son temps, 714 and 742, Note 23. Desramaut faults Motto
and Church historian G. Martina with taking the statement at face value.

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Journal of Salesian Studies
report for the main point-that Don Bosco was rather heavily involved.
Against some historians who doubt or deny, he writes:
[Historian] De Cesare, while admitting the possibility of Don Bosco's
contacts with the government's representative, dismisses Francesia's
statements with finality: ''There's not a shred of documentary evidence of Don
Bosco's involvement." On the contrary, the facts as we know them today
reveal the rashness of De Cesare's conclusion. Very reliable documentation
and a whole series of verifiable controls support the thesis of Don Bosco's
direct, explicit and sustained mediating activity.s9
That Don Bosco was involved in some way, that he discussed matters with
Pius IX and Cardinal Antonelli, and that he presented a list of candidates for the
sees of Piedmont is beyond doubt. Tonello himself states as much in his report
of February 1, 1867, to the government:
[Cardinal Antonelli] handed me a note, which I enclose herewith and of which
I retain a copy. It's a list of persons that in the judgment of the Holy See may
be nominated to episcopal sees. I would suggest that the government make
appropriate inquiries. I have reason to believe that the names proposed for
Piedmont were suggested by the Torinese priest, Don Bosco. I think he came
to Rome for that purpose.60
The last sentence shows that Tonello was aware of Don Bosco's presence in
Rome and of some of his activities, and that they may even have met. But it
seems to cast doubts on the idea that the two had been engaged in repeated
conversations.
(4) Bishops' Appointments and Don Bosco's Involvement
Lists of candidates were submitted both by the government and by the Holy
See. Don Bosco had contributed a list of candidates for dioceses of the
Piedmont region. But on January 17, 1867, a Bill was presented in the Italian
parliament specifying the final disposition of confiscated Church property (the
Borgatti-Scaloja Bill). The furor that followed had the effect of delaying
agreement on the nominations. Furthermore, inquiries and counterproposals by
both sides regarding candidates turned out to be time-consuming. But by the
beginning of February progress had been made. It was due first of all to the fact
that both parties agreed not to aim at reconciling opposite positions on general
principles, but rather at dealing with each case individually as expediency
s9 Motto, l 'azione mediatrice, 283, c1tmg De Cesare's work of 1905. On p.
284, Note 78, Motto adduces reasons in support of Francesia's credibility i n
essential points.
60 Quoted in Motto, l'azione mediatrice, 291, citing the Historical Archive of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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required. It was due also, on the one hand, to the Italian government's sunender
of jurisdictional claims such as the political oath and the submission of the
Bulls of appointment;61 and on the other, to the willingness of the Holy See to
accommodate the government's candidates as much as possible.
The list of candidates submitted by Don Bosco contained 13 names. In
the process of Don Bosco' s beatification in 1891 , Father Berto testified to
having seen the list, at the head of which (pei primi) appeared the name of
Canon Lorenzo Gastaldi.62 In the autograph list of 13 names that Cardinal
Antonelli handed to Tonello and that Tonello transmitted to Florence on
February 1, Gastaldi' s name is in second place.63
Clearly Don Bosco strongly favored the appointment of Canon Gastaldi
who, besides being a worthy candidate, was also a supporter of Don Bosco arxl
his work. In a letter to Father Durando dated February 4, Father Francesia
writes from Rome:
In recent days, Don Bosco has been hatching, and is in fact hatching, a plot
against Canon Gastaldi, our esteemed professor of moral theology. When you
next see him in class, tell him so. But if he asks what the scheme is all about,
you shall say that it's not for you to say. It' s a mystery, and mum's the
word.64
On February 9, 1867, Cardinal Antonelli handed to Professor Tonello a second
list of 23 possible nominees, to which Tonello added another 3 . Possibly Don
Bosco contributed some names also to this list.
By this time, however, the country was in a state of turmoil occasioned
by the violent campaign unleashed against the Borgatti-Scaloja Bill (mentioned
above), bitterly opposed (for different reasons) by both Catholic and anticlerical
factions alike. The Ricasoli government fell, and the electoral campaign that
61 Cf. Note 38 above.
62 FDB (Rua section) 2,333 Al2.
63 Cf. Note 60 and related text above for a mention of this list. The names (or
titles) of the candidates on Don Bosco's list are given in Motto, L'Azione
mediatrice, 291-292. It contained only the names of candidates for episcopal
ordination, not names of existing bishops such as that of Bishop Alessandro
Riccardi di Netro of Savona. According to Father Francesia, Bishop Riccardi and
Don Bosco had held conversations in Rome. "[Don Bosco] had a talk with the future
archbishop of Turin[?!], who had earlier met with him at [Count] Vimercati's house.
He will no doubt be favorable to us, I woulc! say, out of gratitude to Don Bosco" [G.
B. Francesia to F. Oreglia di Santo Stefano, January 17, 1867, in IBM VIII, 596 .
Cf. Note 55 and related text above]. But, one may ask, if the text of the letter is
genuine how could Francesia know at the time [January 17) that Bishop Riccardi
would be "the future archbishop of Turin"? In any case, Don Bosco did not submit
the name of Bishop Riccardi of Savona, who was appointed archbishop of Turin in
the consistory of February 22, 1867.
64 G. B. Francesia to Celestino Durando, February 4, 1867 , in IBM VIII, 642.

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followed was fought on platforms pro or con Ricasoli's conciliating
ecclesiastical policy.
Meanwhile in a secret consistory held on February 22, 1867, Pius IX
announced 17 episcopal nominations or transfers to dioceses in various regions
of Italy. And even though in the heat of the electoral battle Ricasoli had to
promise that the government would desist from further accords with the Holy
See, on March 27 the pope nominated another 17 bishops, whom the
government had approved on March 9.65
Bishop Alessandro Riccardi of Savona was transferred to Turin as
archbishop, while Canon Lorenzo Gastaldi was named bishop of Saluzzo. The
remaining diocesan sees in Piedmont were filled with "friends" of Don Bosco.
Only three dioceses whose pastors had recently died were left vacant for the
duration.
Back in Turin on March 2, Don Bosco through letters and memorandums
continued to press for bishops' appointments. In a letter to Cardinal Antonelli,
after reporting the general feeling of satisfaction for the appointments already
made, he makes further suggestions:
The situation in which Bishop [Giovanni Antonio] Baima fincis himself
merits careful consideration. This worthy prelate is deservedly regarded as a
saint. His private and public life testify to this. For the past 20 years he has
worked untiringly for vacant dioceses, sparing himself neither the fatigue of
trips nor the pains of visits to government departments. In spite of this, his
name does not appear on anyone' s iist of candidates. This has made a bad
impression, and a thousand rumors have begun to circulate. Moreover, he
fmds himself in financial straits and gets by thanks to free-will offerings
from kind and ct.aritable persons. Please do look into this matter and do all
you can for a person who is universally regarded as pious, learned, wise and
zealous.
We have a number of persons here who are highly regarded for their virtue,
and would be well received by all authorities. Among these are [Pietro
Giocondo] Salvaj, vicar general of Alba, [Pietro] Garga, vicar general of
Novara, [Giovanni Battista] Bottino, canon of the cathedral of Turin, Canon
[Francesco] Nasi of the same. Even more deserving of consideration is Father
Dr. [Francesco] Marengo, professor of theology in the seminary of Turin. [...]
All these persons are completely devoted to the Holy See.66
In response Cardinal Antonelli laments the government's unwillingness to
pursue further negotiations and assures Don Bosco that his suggestions will be
taken into consideration. In allusive rather than explicit words he writes:
I need not speak at length of the Holy See's desire to reach a general
settlement regarding the dioceses that remain vacant. We cannot therefore but
65 Cf. Motto, L 'Azione mediatrice, 292-295.
66 Don Bosco to Cardinal Antonelli, Turin, April 5, 1867, in Motto. Epistolario
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lament the fact that no further progress is being made, due to the lack of
response from the parties pledged to negotiations. And yet tl:e initial
breakthroughs held out such hope of success. It would be highly desirable that
some way be found prudently to apply pressure where appropriate, so as to
overcome the present state of stagnation. Meanwhile I have not neglected to
take the additional suggestions you made into due consideration. I have given
special attention to your just recommendation of the worthy prelate who has
labored hard and long for the orphaned dioceses.67
From Florence Professor Tonello also continued to work in the pursuit of the
same goal, with no success. By May I , 1867, the government had shut the
door on further negotiations.68
V. A Mission Entrusted to Don Bosco by Prime Minister
Luigi Federico Menabrea (January-March, 1869)?
1. Political developments
The rhetoric and the activities of Italian revolutionaries, Garibaldi's in
particular, in the year following the removal of the French garrison showed
how perilous the situation had become. France's demand that the Italian
government keep revolutionaries in check and prevent an attack on Rome had
no effect in spite of the best intentions. On October 20, 1867 Garibaldi escaped
from Caprera, the small island where he was "confined," and marched on Rome
with some 9,000 volunteers, while a bloody but unsuccessful uprising was
taking place in Rome.
The papal troops surrendered to Garibaldi at Moterotondo. near Rome, but
because of the failure of the uprising he refrained from attacking Rome itself.
Instead, on November 3 he engaged and defeated another contingent of papal
troops at Mentana. The French forces stationed at Civitavecchia with their
superior chassepot frrepower drove the insurgents back into Italian territory,
where Garibaldi was captured by Italian forces, placed under arrest and returned
to Caprera.
During the whole Roman crisis in the year 1867, popular protests in
support of Garibaldi and dissention in regard to the Roman question caused the
repeated fall of the government. Ricasoli was unable to form a cabinet.
Rattazzi and Menabrea, who succeeded him, were unable to sustain the pressure
and were forced to resign. The chaotic condition of the economy, the war debt,
and the mounting deficits, which the sale at auction of confiscated Church
67 Cardinal Antonelli to Don Bosco, Rome, June 4, 1867, in ASC 126.2 Leuere
a Don Bosco, FDB 1441 E9-12. The prelate is the above-mentioned Giovanni
Antonio Baima, titular bishop of Ptolemais. He was subsequently appomted
archbishop of Cagliari in Sardinia.
68 Cf. Motto, L'Azione mediatrice, 295-299.

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property and additional taxes were unequal to compensate, complicated the
problem.
The years 1868 and 1869 were especially troubled years. In Italy
nationwide popular unrest and mass demonstrations against the grist tax (May
21 , 1868) required deployment of army units and the use of force with
numerous victims. In Rome revolutionaries were executed or imprisoned in
great numbers.
In 1868 Garibaldi was elected to parliament from his district for the
second time, but refused. In a letter dated December 24, 1868, he denounced the
government as "the negation of God," for betraying the cause during the recent
failed attempt against Rome. He added: "What can one expect from a
government that is nothing but an internal revenue service, a corrupt devourer
of public wealth, and an agent in the pay of a foreign tyrant?"69
Two cabinets headed by Prime Minister Menabrea were formed in
succession.
2. Don Bosco Invited to Florence by Prime Minister Luigi
Federico Menabrea? 70
It was during the second Menabrea cabinet (January 5, 1868 - May 7, 1869)
that Don Bosco may have again been involved in Church-state affairs. In a
letter to Chevalier Carlo Canton, a department head, second grade, in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Don Bosco writes:
Please see that His Excellency Menabrea gets the enclosed letter. It is to
thank him for his kindness. There is also a confidential message [for him] in
it, to which he may ask you to reply, should he think it necessary.71
The confidential message alluded to could conceivably have had to do with
some Church-state matter in which Don Bosco was involved.
Entries in a short chronicle by Father Rua might be cited in
confirmation. In this chronicle he speaks of invitations made to Don Bosco by
the government and of Don Bosco's stay in Florence. He writes:
(1868] November: Don Bosco received an invitation from [Prime] Minister
Menabrea. He is requested to go to Florence to discuss important matters. (...]
1869. January 1: Don Bosco received two stags as a gift from His Majesty
the King. Some time ago he received another invitation from the King to go
to Florence. [...]
January 7: Don Bosco again gathered all the boys of the house in the study
hall to bid us good-bye. He is about to leave for Rome. He told us that he had
69 Compact DeAgostini, 161.
70 Motto, L 'azione mediatrice, 299-302.
71 Don Bosco to Carlo Canton, Turin, November 2, 1868, in Motto,
Epistolario, 591-592. Don Bosco had received help from government ministries.

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very important business to attend to there that would be of great advantage to
the Oratory. He asked us to help him with our prayers [...]. He left for Florence
where he spent 8 days; from there he journeyed on to Rome. His stay in
Florence was in response to the above-mentioned invitations. We don' t know
as yet what he did there, but it appears that he held conversations with highly
placed [government] persons. In Rome he avoided public appearances in order
to attend to business with greater freedom. [...] During Don Bosco's sojourn
in the eternal city the news leaked that a new slate of bishops was being
prepared to fi 11 vacant sees.72
In Florence Don Bosco lodged with his good friends, Marquis and Marchioness
Uguccioni-Gherardi. Letters from the marchioness to Chevalier Oreglia di
Santo Stefano and from Don Bosco himself to Father Rua confirm Don
Bosco' s week-long stay in Florence. These letters, however, make no reference
to any conversations held with any government officials. On the other hand, a
letter from Father Domenico Verda, O.P. to Oreglia, taken at face value,
confirms Don Bosco's meeting with the above-mentioned Carlo Canton, a
department head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and with Prime Minister
Menabrea himself.73 Verda writes:
Marquis Uguccioni and Mr. Carlo Canton, department head in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, met him at the station. [... ] Saturday morning I hurried to Mr.
Canton's office. Not finding Don Bosco there, I went back down to the
courtyard [of the Pitti palace] and there I saw him trying to find his way
around. [...] I took him by the hand and guided him up to Mr. Canton, with
whom he reached an understanding on a variety of issues. [The meeting over] I
accompanied him to see Father Giulio (Metti), and then escorted him back to
the government palace for his appointmen t with [Prime Minister] Menabrea.
[.. .]74
On the basis of the Rua chronicle and of the letters, Lemoyne speaks of a
meeting with Menabrea, and conjectures that the Prime Minister entrusted Don
Bosco with an unofficial mission to the Holy See.75
That a meeting took place in Florence is practically certain. That Don
Bosco was entrusted with a mission is not attested but cannot be ruled out.
Reason can be adduced. The execution of revolutionaries in Rome had caused a
public outcry and drawn official protests from the Italian government. Prime
72 Rua, Chronicle, in ASC I IO Cronachette, Rua, FDBM I,205 E12 - 1.206 A 1.
The use of past tenses by Father Rua in the January 7 entry would indicate that the
entry was made after the "event," perhaps following an oral report by Don Bosco.
The chief reason for Don Bosco's trip to Rome was to try again for the approval of
the Salesian Society, which he obtained on March 1, 1869.
73 Prime Minister Menabrea served also as Minister for Foreign Affairs.
74 Domenico Verda to Federico Oreglia di Santo Stefano, Florence, S. Marco,
January 10, 1869, in IBM IX, 582, EBM IX, 221.
75 IBM IX, 482-483; EBM IX, 221-223.

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Minister Menabrea hoped to establish some kind of understanding with the
papal government for a possible solution of the Roman Question. The opening
of the Vatican Council was imminent, and the Italian government was eager to
guarantee its freedom. A number of vacant dioceses (3 in Piedmont alone) were
still awaiting episcopal appointments. These and other matters needed to be
resolved.
Motto fou nd no further documentation of Don Bosco' s mediation on this
occasion.
VI. Don Bosco and Bishops' Nominations in 1871
1. Political Developments
The First Vatican Council opened on December 8, 1869, in St. Peter's in
Rome, with some 600 bishops in attendance. It would continue its
deliberations until September 1870 and be adjourned sine die after the
occupation of Rome by the Italian army. The Constitutions Dei Filius and
Pastor aetemus, the latter defining papal infallibility (July 18), were its two
principal documents.
On the political front, the election of Leftist members of parliament to
leadership post5 forced the resignation of Prime Minister Menabrea and the
dissolution of his cabinet. On December 14, 1869, a new government was
formed by Prime Minis!er Giovanni Lanza who also held the Ministry of
Interior. Shortly thc::reafter, in February 1870, taking advantage of popular
unrest, Giuseppe Mazzini returned to Italy with the object of organizing a
revolution, overthrowing the constitutional government, taking Rome and
establishing a republic. Upri~ings broke out in several Italian cities in the
months that followed, but the revolts were put down, and Mazzini was arrested
in Palermo (Sicily) and imprisoned. (He was later released on the occasion of
the amnesty decreed to cele brate the occupation of Rome.)
Meanwhile, on July 19, 1870, France declared war on Prussia ostensibly
to prevent a Hohenzollern from occupying the Spanish throne, while Italy
declared irs neutrality. The war was quickly over. On September l, in the battle
of Sedan, the French suffered a crushing defeat, and Napoleon III himself was
taken prisoner. On September 4, 1870 the Third Republic was proclaimed in
Paris.
At the onset of the hostilities, on August 5, the French expeditionary
force deployed for the protection of Rome had been recalled. Immediately the
Italian parliament in extraordinary session voted for a quick settlement of the
Roman question "in accordance with national aspirations." A memorandum
was dispatched to the European powers emphasizing the urgent need of settling
the Roman question, so as to forestall a republican revolutionary takeover.
On September 5, following Napoleon's defeat, the Italian government
reached the unanimous decision to occupy Rome, though not before making a
further attempt to get Pius IX to surrender the city voluntarily and peaceably.

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Count Gustavo Ponza di San Martino was the bearer of a letter from King
Victor Emmanuel II to Pius IX guaranteeing the Holy See' s complete
independence for the exercise of its spiritual office. As expected, Pius IX
rejected the proposal with disdain. On September 20, 1870, the Italian .artillery
opened a breach in the wall at Porta Pia, and the ensuing skirmishes left 49
Italian and 19 papal soldiers dead. The surrender was signed, and the whole city,
with the exception of the Vatican palaces where Pius IX had taken refuge, was
occupied. In early October by popular referendum Rome and the surrounding
territory of Latium were annexed to Italy . With the encyclical Respicientes of
November 1, 1870, Pius IX declared the occupation "unjust, violent, null and
illegal." He deplored the condition of captivity that prevented the pope from
exercising his sovereign pastoral office. He excommunicated the king of Italy
and anyone who might have had anything to do with the usurpation.
To reassure the international community, but also pursuing a policy that
had guided the Historic Right since Cavour, Prime Minister Lanza introduced a
Bill to establish guarantees for the free exercise of the pope's pastoral office
that the king had promised in his letter. On January 22, 1871 , debate began in
parliament of a Dill entitled "Prerogatives of the Pope and the Holy See, and
Relations between Church and State in Italy." The "Law of Guarantees," as the
Bill is commonly known, was approved in the Senate on May 2, and published
on May 15.76 By the encyclical Ubi nos (May 15, 1871) Pius IX rejected the
law as a scheme "to deceive Catholics and soothe their anxiety." He affirmed
once again that temporal power was the only true guarantee of the pope's
independence.
At the same time, Lanza presented a Bill to transfer the capital from
Aorence to Rome. The official transfer took place on July 1, 1871 , and on
76 The Law of Guarantees was based on Cavour' s political principle, "a free
Church in a free state." It was divided into two parts: "Prerogatives of the Supreme
Pontiff and of the Holy See," and "Relations between Church and State in Italy."
Part I comprised Articles 1-13. Anicles 1-8 dealt with the pope's prerogatives: (I)
immunity of papal territorial residences (the Vatican, the Lateran and the villa of
Castelgandolfo); (2) an endowment of 3,225,000 lire, comparable to the former
papal revenues; (3) personal inviolability; (4) right to honors as a sovereign ruler
and to a corps of armed guards; (5) free, unimpeded exercise of the spiritual power;
(6) right to free, uncensored communication in and outside Italy, and the power to
receive and appoint ambassadors. Articles 9-13 of Part I dealt with the Holy See's
right freely to communicate with the faithful, with the clergy and with governments
throughout the world. Part II (comprising Articles 14-19) exempted the clergy from
royal controls. In panicular it abolished the bishops' traditional oath of allegiance
to the king and all restrictions to the clergy' s right of assembly. The final anicle
20 abrogated all preceding contrary laws and customs. In spite of papal rejection,
the law remained in effect until the concordat of 1929.

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July 2 King Victor Emmanuel II and his government made their solemn entry
into the eternal city.11
Such then were the new political arrangements and the ensuing political
climate that marked the years 1871-1874. It was the period of Don Bosco's
deepest involvement in matters of Church and state. He worked hard and long
for the nomination and appointment of bishops to the many dioceses that still
remained vacant. Subsequently, while engaged in a veritable struggle to have
the Salesian constitutions definitively approved, he was deeply involved in
negotiating a formula that would guarantee for the bishops, once appointed, the
royal Exequatur and their rightful temporalities.
2. Don Rosco's Mediation for the Appointment of Bishops in
1871
(1) Don Bosco's Letters to Cardinal Berardi and to Pius XI
Don Bosco had been in Rome from ca. January 25 to February 23, 1870,
during the early working phase of Vatican I, when the debates pro and con the
advisability of defining papal infallibility were the order of the day. On January
5, prior to his visit to Rome, Don Bosco had the premonitory "vision" of a
divine visitation on Paris and Rome that goes by the name of "Prophecy of
1870." He saw his dark premonitions partly verified in the Franco-Prussian
War and in the taking of Rome. After the occupation of Rome, while the Law
of Guarantees was being debated, Don Bosco again returned to his somber
reflections in letters to Rome. To Cardinal Berardi he wrote:
I wish I could be the bearer of good news, but alas I have only distressing
news to convey. Nevertheless the person who has in the past been favored
with extraordinary lights is in a position to assure you that the present [sad]
situation in Rome will not last longer than the current year. [...] In the
meantime, however, distressing events will take place in Rome, as I
mentioned in an earlier Jetter that may not even have reached you. There will
be serious violations of places sacred and profane and attacks on persons
resulting in loss of li fe. In those days God will certainly inspire the Holy
Father as to what course he should take. But for his own safety and that of the
people around him he may well have to leave the Vatican and eventually return
to be the consoling angel of his people in distress.78
77 The government and parliament were established in the Montecitorio Palace
later in 1871 . It still took the better part of a year before the transfer of government
offices was completed. Officially Florence served as the capital of Italy from
February 3, 1865 to July I, 1871.
78 Don Bosco to Cardinal Giuseppe Berardi, Turin, April 11 , 1871, in Motto,
Epistolario III, 320-321. In L'azione mediatrice, 303, Motto states that this letter
was addressed to Cardinal Secretary of State Antonelli.

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A letter written a few days later to Pope Pius IX expresses similar dire
premonitions.
We hope and pray that the Lord in his mercy will come quickly to our aid and
shorten our days of trial. [...] We hope and pray that God will hear our
entreaties and prayers and that before this year is over peace will be restored
to the Church. We shall then have the joy of paying homage to the Church's
supreme Head in the Vatican and of seeing him in full possession and master
of his Church. [...] In the meantime, however, the fear remains lest heavy
trials befall Rome and her children. In any case, it is certain that Your
Holiness shall have to pass through a terrible ordeal, to be followed by a
triumph more glorious than any triumph in the past.79
(2) Don B osco's Activities in June 1871: A Conference with Prime
Minister Giovanni Lanza in Florence?
The tension following the occupation of Rom e and the total rejection of the
Law of Guarantees on the pope' s part brought about a situation of fear and
uncertainty. Don Bosco' s dire presentiments did not seem ill founded. In spite
of all this, on purely religious grounds bishops needed to be appointed to the
many sees that still remained vacant.
Biographer Angel:> Amadei, author of Volume X of the Biographical
Memoirs, relates that in June 1871, on the occasion of Pius !X's j ubilee (the
25th anniversary of his election of the Chair of Peter) Don Bosco decided to
act.
In summary this is how the story (now thought to be spurious) goes as
told in the Biographical Memoirs).80 ( 1) D on B osco is said to have obtained the
pope's permission to approach the Italian government in a private capacity on
the subject of new nominations of bishops to vacant dioceses. (2) As he was
planning a new trip to Rome, on the occasion of the pope's jubilee, passing
through Florence, he wrote to Prime Minister Lanza for an appo intment. (3)
Immediately he wrote to Count Tommaso Uguccioni-Gherardi that he would be
in Florence on the evening of June 22 at 7:35 and catch a train two hours later
79 Don Bosco to Pius IX, Turin, April 14, 1871, in Motto, Episcolario III, 322-
323. The fears voiced in these letters reflect the agony of the Catholic conscience
in the context of the "dispossession of the Church." Don Bosco's Prophecy of
1870 (referred to above) expressed similar premonitions. In his Prophecy of 1873
he anticipates the pope' s flight from Rome and a slaughter of Catholic priests and
laity. For these texts, cf. EBM X, 49-59. In the letters Don Bosco also expresses
the view (shared by other Catholics at the time) that the situation of Rome would be
reversed in the near future. In other words, it was hoped (unrealistically) that the
liberal establishment would be forced out of Rome either through divine or human
intervention, and that the temporal power would be restored to the pope.
80 EBM X, 186-192; 194-196.

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for Rome. He would see the count and his family on the way back. 81 (4) Don
Bosco arrived by train punctually and ran to his appointment. ("Your
Excellency should know that I am above all a Catholic." "Yes, we know that
Don Bosco is more Catholic than the pope!") (5) After initial comments,
Lanza is said to have agreed in principle to the nomination of bishops, and
Don Bosco suggested that the government refrain from demanding the
suppression of small dioceses. (6) A this point Lanza was called away to attend
a meeting of the cabinet presided over by the king himself. (7) Returning over
an hour later, Lanza reported that the ministers had no objection to the
nomination of bishops, but that they wanted the number of dioceses reduced.
(Amadei regards such a demand as motivated by the desire to confiscate more
Church property.) Obviously Don Bosco was in no position to deal with this
further issue, and if that was a condition, he would have to withdraw. (8) Lanza
returned to the ministers and then returned to report that the government agreed
to leave aside for the moment the matter of the suppression of small dioceses.
(9) After some further discussion (which in Amadei's view aimed at making
Don Bosco commit himself), abruptly Prime Minister Lanza brought the
meeting to a close with the words, "So. Don Bosco, let's be off for Rome?"
"Let's," Don Bosco replied.82 (10) Lanza was driven to the station in a coach
and boarded a first-class car. Don Bosco trotted along on foot and took a
second-class seat. (1 1) In an audience (on June 28) Don Bosco made a report to
the pope, stressing that he had acted in a private capacity in order not to
compromise the Church in any way. (12) Pius IX is said to have authorized
Don Bosco to continue the conversations unofficially . Don Bosco is said to
have met with the Prime Minister before and after the papal audience.
Both Desramaut and Motto are skeptical about the story. Motto points
out thai: the timetable given in Don Bosco's letter to Count Uguccioni leaves
little room for a meeting (in two sessions with a long interval in between!)
with the Prime Minister on the evening of June 22, between 8 and 10. Cabinet
meetings and Lanza's own movements, are recorded and do not tally with those
described in the Biographical Memoirs. For example, the only day of Lanza' s
and Don Bosco' s simultaneous presence in Rome was July 1, when Don Bosco
was preparing to leave the city for Florence and Turin, and when the Prime
Minister was busy with preparations for the official entrance of the king. But
Motto stops short of denying that the two ever met. He merely supposes a
looser time frame.83 Desramaut denies that the Lanza interview ever took
81 Don Bosco to Tommaso Uguccioni-Gherardi, Turin, June 2 1, 1871: "I leave
for Rome in the morning. In Florence I shall stop a mere two hours, waiting [to
catch the next train], that is, from 7:35 to 10 PM. On my way back, God willing, I
shall stop over for a couple of days and pay you and your family a visit" [Motto,
Epistolario III, 341-342].
82 The capital was being transferred to Rome in those very days, a situation
requiring Lanza's presence there. The King made his official appearance in the new
capital on July 2.
83 Motto, L 'azione mediatrice, 305-306, esp. notes 142 and 143.

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place.84 He sees it as a literary doublet of the meeting that took place the
following September and that Amadei took (already fictionalized) from
Lemoyne' s Documenti.85
(3) Don Bosco's Activity in August and September 1871
[Don Bosco at Countess Corsi's Villa]
Don Bosco remained in Rome from June 22 to July 1, and attended the
celebrations of the pope's jubilee. In the private audience of June 28 Pius IX,
who had resolved to proceed with the appointment of bishops to the dioceses
that still remained vacant, asked Don Bosco to submit names and information
on worthy candidates. Back in Turin on July 4, after a two-day stopover in
Florence, Don Bosco was immediately engrossed in affairs of the Society, the
opening of a Salesian school at Varazze, and the closing of the school at
Cherasco, visits to Salesian houses. From August 6 to · 20, he attended the
spiritual retreats "for lay people" at St. Ignatius retreat house near Lanzo.
Don Bosco had for some time been suffering from a painful illness that
seriously affected his feet and that was to grow worse with the years. He
therefore took advantage of a standing invitation from Countess Gabriella
Corsi of Nizza Monferrato to spend a few days at her place in quiet seclusion,
from August 21 to 30.
1he Biographical Memoirs ,86 following Lemoyne's story in Documenti,
speak of a meeting of diocesan vicars called by Don Bosco to help him
compile his list of episcopal candidates. We read in Documenti:
From Lanzo Don Bosco, attended by Father Francesia, traveled to Nizza
Monferrato, where he was the guest of Countess Corsi at her secluded villa.
The Countess used to spend the summer and autumn season there with the
family of her brother-in-law, Count Cesare Balbo. Don Bosco began to work
on a list of names of priests that he regarded worthy of being named bishops.
He had written numerous letters to obtain information, and had invited
outstanding priests to come to Nizza for a conference. Mgr. Tortone came to
Nizza at Don Bosco's request to discuss some candidates. On one occasion
seated at the dinner table with him were no less than 18 diocesan vicars
84 F. Desramaut, "L'audience imaginaire du ministre Lanza (Florence, 22 juin
1871)," Ricerche Storiche Salesiane 11 :l (1992) 9-34, with documentation and a
reconstruction of events.
85 Lemoyne records the story, set in June, in Documenti XII, 146-149, FDB
1,017 Al2 - B3. According to Desramaut it may have been Father Francesia's
creation, that is, an inference in the context of Don Bosco's new trip to Rome [G.
B. Francesia, Vita breve e popolare di D. Giovanni Bosco (Torino: Liberia
Salesiana, 1902), 302-305). The story of the meeting with Lanza exhibits striking
similarities with the story of the meeting with Minister Ricasoli on a similar prior
occasion [Cf. Note 49 and related text above].
86 EBM X, 195-197.

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general and capitular. These conferences, however, were held covertly (alla
chetichella), the villa lying secluded among the hills, guests arriving
separately and unobserved. Don Bosco could thus compile his list of
candidates and forward it to the Holy Father.87
According to Lemoyne (in Documenti), and to Amadei (in the Biographical
Memoirs) Don Bosco returned from Rome with a clear strategy in mind, the
convening of a conference. However, the two letters to the countess whereby
he set up his trip give no hint that such was the case, and surely the countess
had a right to know. True, Don Bosco speaks of visitors, but they appear to be
casual visitors from the area. He writes in one letter:
I think I shall have time to accommodate everybody. But let's keep to thi s
norm. Those that come with an offering or to discuss things pertaining to the
good of souls are welcome at any time on any day. I shall be very happy to see
them. Those that come merely to pay their respects should be thanked and
dismissed.88
The conversations, apparently informal, held at the Corsi villa may or may not
have had a bearing on the bishops' nominations. But it is certain that Don
Bosco was working 011 his list of candidates. He was also was encouraging
vicars of vacant diocese to petition the Holy Father to act.89
[Pius !X's Letter to the King and Don Bosco?°
As Don Bosco was leaving for Nizza and Countess Corsi's villa, Pius IX, on
August 21 , 187 1, was addressing a letter to King Victor Emmanuel II declaring
his intention to appoint bishops to vacant dioceses in Italy. The King was
vacationing in the Alps at the time, and the letter was delivered to Mgr.
Tortone, the Holy See's charge d'affaires in Turin , by a trusted messenger. An
attached note by Cardinal Antonelli suggested that Tortone consult with Don
Bosco as to the safest way of getting the letter into the King's hands. Twice
Tortone invited Don Bosco to Turin by telegram "to deal with an urgent
matter." Don Bosco replied that "poor health and other business" prevented him
from leaving Nizza. Terrone was only too glad to dispense with Don Bosco's
17 Documenti XII, 156, FDB 1,017 BIO. Motto points out that the presence at
Nizza of Mgr. Gaetano Tortone, the Holy See's charge d'affaires in Turin, cannot be
reconciled with his attested activities at the time, as will be seen. Lemoyne's
testimony in the process of Don Bosco's beatification at this point [FDB-Rua 2478
A3] cannot be taken at face value.
18 Don Bosco to Countess Gabriella Corsi, St. Ignatius, August 18, 1871, in
Motto, Episotlario III, 360.
89 Don Bosco to Mgr. Pietro Giuseppe De Gaudenzi, Turin, September 4, 1871,
in Motto, Epistolario III, 366-367. Cf. Motto, L 'azione mediatrice, 307.
90 Here I summarize Motto, L'azione mediatrice, 308-310, where documentation
is submitted.

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re services and entrusted the letter to a court chaplain and to the king's aide
camp.91 The king pondered the letter and on August 3 1 handed it to Prime
Minister Lanza, in Turin at the time. The Holy See had meanwhile contacted
archbishops and bishops to submit lists of candidates, and since the news of
imminent nominations had leaked out, Lanza immediately called a meeting of
the cabinet in Florence. But before sending a report to the king, he wished to
have a talk with Don Bosco. Don Bosco had by this time returned from Nizz.a
and was at Lanzo with the Salesians' retreat. Lanza dispatched a telegram to the
Prefect of Turin, who surrunoned Don Bosco to his office and relayed the
Prime Minister's message to him. To Father Gioachino Berto, who had gone
with him to the Prefect's office, Don Bosco said that the summons came as no
surprise, for he had been involved in this matter by the pope's command for
quite some time. He added:
I regret to have to leave this very night and be absent for several days while
the spiritual retreat is in progress at Lanzo. Besides I feel quite tired. But the
good of the Church must come first; it has priority even over the good of our
congregation. I shall take the 7 o' clock train this evening, travel the whole
night, and be in Horence early tomorrow for my meeting at the Ministry.92
[Don Bosco in Florence]
We have no report on the topics of the talks at the ministry. But (1) it is likely
that Lanza stressed the need of appointing moderate candidates as bishops. A
confirmation of this may be read into the letter that the king wrote to the pope
immediately afterwards. The king and his government would welcome the
appointment of "persons who can join to the discharge of their pastoral duties a
high regard for the laws of the state." (2) Agreement was reached on allowing
freedom to the pope to choose candidates as he saw fit and on the granting of
temporalities by the government. Don Bosco refers to these agreements in a
later letter to Lanza: "When I had the honor of conferring with Your Excellency
[.. .] I took it as agreed that the government was going to allow freedom of
choice to the pope and place no obstacle in the matter of temporalities."93
[Don Bosco in Rome and the Nomination ofBishops]
With these assurances, from Florence Don Bosco went on to Rome and made
his report to Pius IX and to Cardinal Antonelli. He had compiled a list of
candidates and noted their credentials. He may already have discussed his list of
91 Tortone and people at court doubted Don Bosco's discretion [Motto, L 'azione
mediatrice, 308, Note 155).
92 Berta' s testimony at the process of Don Bosco's beatification, in ASC 161:
Testi, FDB 2,108 C9.
93 Don Bosco to Prime Minister Lanza, Varazze, February 11 , 1872, in Motto,
Epistolario III. 398.

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candidates in his meeting with Lanza, and may even have made a case for the
worthiness of some who may not have had the reputation of "moderates." The
list which he presented in Rome is attested in four holograph sheets from the
Secret Vatican Archive, cited by Motto.94 Don Bosco submitted 10 names, all
basically recommendable, some without any reservation, others only in certain
respects. He writes:
Having pondered all aspects of the matter before the Lord and offered special
prayers, I believe the following can be put forward as models of pastoral
ministry.
1. Giovanni Battista Bottino. He is a doctor in theology, a canon of the
cathedral [in Turin] and a preacher of renown.
2. Celestino Fissore. He is a canon of the same [cathedral), a doctor in
theology and canon law, and a jurist of renown. He has been for many years
vicar general of the diocese of Turin.
3. Giorgio Oreglia. He is a canon, provost and vicar general and capitular
of the diocese of Fossano.
The three above-listed candidates are also well-to-do.
Canon Luigi Nasi is worthy in every respect. But he's in very poor health.
Both Canon [Stanislao] Gazzelli [di Rossana] and Canon [Carlo] Morozzo
[della Rocca] can be recommended and are moreover readily acceptable to the
king. But in the present circumstances they are not as desirable as the first
three above.
Recommendable but less appropriate would be the nomination of Provost
Gaeti, vicar forane of Castel Ceriolo. He is completely acceptable to the king
to whom he is very close, but his theological education is spotty.
Mgr. Andrea Scotton, a canon of Bassano Veneto. He preached in the
cathedral [of Turin] and gave evidence of saintliness and great learning. He
comes recommended by numerous works and supporting reports. He is well-
to-do, in great health, courageous to a fault.
Canon [Anacleto Pietro] Siboni, vicar general and capitular of Albenga,
comes highly recommended from many quarters.
Bishop [Lorenzo] Gastaldi of Saluzzo has support among the best of the
clergy on account of his learning and piety. They would like him transferred
to Turin. As a doctor in theology on the faculty of the University of Turin he
would be ideally placed to keep theological studies at the University on the
right track.95
94 Motto, L'azione mediatrice, 311-312.
95 This document is proof positive that Don Bosco did recommend Gastaldi for
Turin, as the Salesian tradition has always held. Later, during his unfortunate and
bitter conflict with the archbishop, Don Bosco maladroitly reminded him of the
fact. He wrote: "I would like you to know that someone in Turin is circulating
certain papers taken from government files. These papers state that the
appointment of Canon Gastaldi as bishop of Saluzzo came about through Don
Bosco's recommendation. And if Bishop Gastaldi was appointed archbishop of
Turin, it was also through Don Bosco's recommendation. There's also a record of
the obstacles that had to be overcome for these appointments, and of the reason
why I supported your candidacy." [Letter of May 14, 1873, in Ceria, Epistolario II,

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Don Bosco submitted other names as well. Amadei, citing Papal Prelate Mgr.
Emiliano Manacorda as the source states that Don Bosco submitted 18 names,
among which those of Giuseppe Sciandra (for the diocese of Acqui) and of
Salvatore Magnasco (for the archdiocese of Genoa).96 It should be borne in
mind that Don Bosco's list, which was concerned only with Piedmont and
Liguria, was only one of many sent in at the request of the Holy See.
There followed a diplomatic shuttle from Rome to various dioceses and
back that could not escape the notice of the press. Speculations, positions pro
and con, and acrimonious debates raged in the press through the remainder of
September and most of October, as appointments became known or
conjectured. Anticlerical sheets conducted the usual defamatory campaign that
contributed significantly to poisoning the atmosphere against particular
nominees.97 But the list of candidates was finalized by Pius IX and, after some
objections, accepted also by the government. Finally on October 27, 1871
Pius held the consistory in which 41 bishops were officially named and
appointed to various dioceses throughout Italy. Among them (for the regions
of the old Kingdom of Sardinia) were: Giovanni Baima (Archdiocese of
Cagliari, Sardinia), Lorenzo Gastaldi (Archdiocese of Turin), Celestino Fissore
(Archdiocese ofVercelli), Pietro Giuseppe De Gaudenzi (Diocese of Vigevano),
and Pietro Anacleto Siboni (Diocese of Albenga)-all five of them proposed
by Don Bosco.98
279]. Gastaldi himself in;. letter to Pius IX complains of Don Bosco's "insolence"
and lack of respect. when the latter claimed to have been reprimanded in Rome for
having supported Gastaldi. [Letter in the Secret Vatican Archive cited by Motto,
L 'Azione mediatrice, 311, Note 167]. One of the reasons why Don Bosco
recommended Gastaldi was that the latter had always been supportive of Don Bosco
and his work and would hopefully continue to do so as archbishop of Turin. It was
not to be.
90 EBM X, 199.
97 The anticlerical satirical newspaper of Turin, fl Fischietto (the Whistle)
undertook a rabid smearing campaign against possible nominees for Turin. The
invective became more vicious as soon as the appointment of Bishop Lorenzo
Gastaldi of Saluzzo to the archdiocese of Turin was announced. The malevolent
satire reached the point of holding him up to ridicule for his physical appearance
[Issues of October 5 and 14, 1871, cited in Giuseppe Tuninetti, Lorenzo Gastaldi,
1815-1883, II: Arcivescovo di Torino: 1871-1883 (Casale Monferrato: Edizioni
PIEMME, 1988), 22-23).
98 Giovanni Balma had been "sponsored" by Don Bosco earlier in a special letter
to Cardinal Antonelli [Cf. Notes 66 and 67 and related text above]. Lorenzo
Gastaldi's appointment to Turin came one year after the death of Archbishop
Riccardi di Netro, who had been appointed in 1867 and had died on October I 6,
1870. The diocese had meanwhile been vacant.

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[Don Rosco 's Continued Involvement in the Nomination of
Bishops]
While the nominations were being pondered and decisions were being made in
Rome, Don Bosco returned to Turin (September 16, 187 1). However, even
pressing affairs of the Congregation and other important commitments did not
stymie Don Bosco's active concern for the vacant sees. Even after the
nominations of October 27, the diocese of Fossano remained vacant, in spite of
earlier petitions by the cathedral chapter, the municipal council and Don Bosco
himself. The authorities in Fossano now renewed their petition, asking
specifically for Mgr. Emiliano Manacorda, a papal prelate and a friend of Don
Bosco and the Salesians. They also asked Don Bosco to act as intermediary
with Cardinal Antonelli and to add his own recommendation. Don Bosco gladly
obliged.99 On November 6, the cardinal notified Don Bosco of the pope' s
favorable decision. Mgr. Manacorda was nominated and appointed bishop of
Fossano in the consistory of November 27, 1871.
Don Bosco' s active involvement in the nomination of bishops continued,
as Motto relates in detail, through the pontificate of Pius IX and his death in
1878, and in a different form even beyond that date.100 It will not be our task to
pursue this later activity of Don Bosco, except to say that in these later
difficult years Don Bosco never ceased to suffer, pray and act for the good of
the Church.
We must now turn our attention to Don Bosco's involvement in
obtaining the royal Exequatur, with its attendant repossession of premises and
revenues (the temporalities), for the bishops, once appointed. In the situation
of conflict brought about by the occupation of Rome and the Law of
Guarantees obtaining this royal permit was now more difficult and more
onerous. This situation opened another chapter in Don Bosco's mediating
activity in Rome.
VII. Don Bosco's Continued Mediation to Obtain Exequatur
and temporalities for Appointed Bishops in the Years
1872-1874
1. Archbishop Gastaldi's Uneasy "Entrance" and Don Bosco's
Illness (December 1871 - February 1872)
Archbishop Gastaldi entered the See of Turin on November 26, 1871. His
entrance was in a less solemn and public form than had been originally
planned. The rabid propaganda of the anticlerical press and the fear lest the
99 Don Bosco to Cardinal Antonelli, Turin, October 31, 1971, in Motto,
Epistolario III, 382-383.
100 Motto, L'Azione mediatrice, 315-322.

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archbishop he subjecte.d to personal abuse forced the City to cancel the
procession and the accompanying pageant. The local civil authorities received
him ambivalently, even if civilly, but one might say that he entered as a
persona non grata. After all, he had been a well known and in many ways
controversial figure, no passive spectator in the religious and political events
of the past quarter century. To forestall confrontation, instead of proceeding to
his cathedral from the church of St. Philip where the clergy was gathered, he
preferred to go there privately from the Church of the Consolata where he had
been "in hiding." Meanwhile the various ranks of Catholic laity and orders of
clergy (among whom Don Bosco) waiting for the archbishop at the Church of
St. Philip proceeded without him to the Cathedral, to find it filled with
Catholic people. 101 The following day the archbishop took up residence in the
diocesan seminary. Nearly three years were to pass before receiving Exequatur
and temporalities.
Walking from St. Philip to the cathedral on November 26, Don Bosco
began to feel ill with a sharp pain in his shoulders and heavy palpitations of
the heart. Back at the Oratory, he seemed to recover. A few days later, in spite
of misgivings, Don Bosco undertook a trip to Genoa for the purpose of
visiting the Salesian houses in Liguria: He visited Marassi and went on to
Varazze, where he arrived on December 4. On December 6, returning to Varazze
by train after paying a visit to a benefactress, he collapsed. He was taken to the
Salesian school and put to bed in the infirmary. This marked the onset of a
very serious illness that kept him bed-ridden for nearly two months. 102 Brother
Enria arrived from Turin on January 12 to serve as attendant. He would stand
watch at Don Bosco's bedside throughout the illness. The illness has never
been exactly diagnosed. Most apparent was an outbreak of tubercles all over the
body with high temperatures, profuse perspiration and eventual shedding of the
skin. The sources call it "miliary fever" (miliaria, prickly heat). There were
also other complications, primarily a deep pain in the shoulder and right arm,
probably of rheumatic origin. At one point Don Bosco saw himself at the
point of death. But by January 5 his condition took a turn for the better, and by
mid-January he could spend a few hours out of bed. On January 30, on his way
to recovery, he began a period of convalescence at the Salesian school of
Alassio, farther west along the Riviera.
101 Tuninetti, Gastaldi II, 15-25.
102 The story of Don Bosco's participation in the archbishop' s "entrance" and of
his subsequent illness at Varazze is told in detail in EBM X, 122-130. The story is
based on letters by Salesians at Varazze to the Salesians in Turin. The letters of
Pietro Enria, who served as Don Bosco sick room attendant throughout the illness ,
constitute the chief source [ASC 112 Malattie di DB, FDB 430 Dl2 - 435 E4. For
comments and evaluation, cf. Desramaut, DB en son temps, 821-824].

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2. Exequaturs and Temporalities: Terms of the Question and
Don Rosco's Involvement in 1872
During the long siege, Don Bosco was kept informed on how matters fared in
the dioceses to which bishops had been recently appointed. Things were not
going well. The bishops were not being given the necessary temporalities. In a
letter written from Varazze before returning to Turin Don Bosco wrote to
Prime Minister Lanza demanding to know why.
I meant to write sooner and ask for a clarification regarding the question of the
temporalities to which the recently appointed bishops are entitled. Illness
has thus far prevented me from doing so. [...] When I had the honor of
conferring with Your Excellency on September 9 [11) past, I understood that
the government agreed not only to allow the pope full freedom in the choice
of candidates, but also not to place any obstacles in the way of their
obtaining the temporalities. [...] I have been receiving inquiries about th is
matter, and I myself would like to know if I was wrong or if the government
has had cause to change its position. [...] When people saw their bishop
forced to take up residence in the diocesan seminary, or in a private house, or
at an inn, or in a rented apanment, they began to take a different view of the
government's credibility.103
What had happened? We must refrain from imputing malicious intent to the
Prime Minister. When he had agreed that the temporalities would not be denied
to the newly appointed bishops, he must have understood that they would be
granted in the form prescribed by law. N ow, if according to the provisions of
the Law of Guarantees the Italian government surrendered the right to nominate
bishops, it still claimed the right to issue the Exequatur. As already noted, the
Exequatur was the name given to a royal permit enabling a newly appointed
bishop to take possession of the bishop's palace and other premises and to
receive revenues from the diocesan benefice, and so set up his household and
administration.
10
'
A royal decree with the date of June
25,
1871
reaffirmed
this
policy and established that to obtain the Exequatur the bishop must submit the
original papal Bull of Appointment to government authorities.105 It seems
anomalous that the government should permit on the one hand the free election
of bishops (as it did in 1871), and then demand that the bishops should present
103 Don Bosco to Prime Minister Lanza, Varazze, February 11, 1872, in Motto,
Epistolario III, 398.
10
•
Exequatur (Exsequatur) though used as a noun
is
a
Latin
verbal
form
meaning
"Let him put into execution." A similar permit (called the Placet, "It is decided") had
to be obtained from the local authority for the appointment and installation of a
pastor.
105 This referred primarily to the Bull of Appointment addressed to the people
(Bulla ad populum). Later the submission of other Bulls would be required. As noted
earlier the Holy See also dispatched Bulls addressed to the clergy (ad clerum), to the
Chapter (ad capitulum) and to the bishop (ad episcopum) [Cf. Note 38 above].

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"official credentials" so as to obtain a permit (Exequatur) to enter into
possession (temporalities). Historically, this was an ancient prerogative
claimed by the kings of Sardinia, who had always followed a ')urisdictionalist"
ecclesiastical · policy. This policy, some times established by concordat,
allowed the sovereign to exercise a measure of control, not only on the
bishops' activities but also on their very nomination. Failure to obtain the
Exequatur would paralyze the running of the diocese from an administrative arrl
juridical point of view. Now by the Law of Guarantees and by royal decree the
bishops could be freely appointed by the pope, but they must obtain the royal
permit for the unimpeded use of diocesan material assets. To ease tension, the
government would later clarify the juridical issue by introducing a distinction:
the submission of the Bull would not be for the purpose of obtaining the
Exequatur with its juridical implications. It would only be for the purpose of
recording officially that the bearer of the Bull was the person to whom the
temporalities pertained.
But the Holy See (and in particular Cardinal Secretary of State Antonelli)
would have none of it, because they did not acknowledge the government's
jurisdiction in the matter. The government was the usurper of the pope's
temporal power and of the properties of the Church and of religious orders. The
bishops, therefore, were instructed to avoid any action (such as the submission
of credentials) that could be construed as recognition of the illegal and unjust
situation. Thus, on October 31, 1871 a circular from the Holy See (Cardinal
Antonelli) directed the bishops to enter their dioceses as soon as possible,
immediately perform some act ofjurisdiction, and send notice of their election
to the government. If the government demanded that they request the Exequatur
in accordance with the law, they were to ignore the demand and take the
consequences. They were not to request the Exequatur either directly or
indirectly. 106
On November 29, 1871, Archbishop Gastaldi reported to Cardinal
Antonelli that his notification to the government had drawn a negative reply
and inquired whether he could request the Exequatur indirectly. He suggested
that the Holy See might supply "a certificate of election" that the bishop could
show to the authorities, and thus obtain the temporalities. Cardinal Antonelli
remained inflexible. And when Gastaldi made a second attempt on January 9,
1872, the cardinal replied that if the Archbishop was in want, the pope would
allot to him, as he did to other bishops, a stipend of 700 lire. 107
The bishops were chafing at the bit under such strictures from the
government and intransigence from the Holy See. Attempts were made in
certain dioceses to get around the obstacle. We have the case of the cathedral
chapter of Saluzzo who petitioned the Minister of Justice for the Exequatur arrl
submitted in lieu of the Bull of Appointment a transcript of the minutes of the
106 Tuninetti, Gastaldi II, 52, citing document from the Archive of the
Archdiocese of Turin.
101 Gastaldi accepted the offer [Tuninetti, ibid., citing sources].

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Journal of Salesian Studies
meeting at which the bishop read the Bull of Appointment to them. The
government granted the Exequatur, signed by the king on February 25, 1872.
Bishop Alfonso Buglione di Monale and his Chapter received a stem rebuke
from Cardinal Antonelli.108
In this case the government's action may have been motivated by the
recognition of the propaganda value of the incident. On the other hand, on
March 3, 1872 the government did relax the condition for obtaining the
temporalities by approving three alternatives to the direct submission of the
original Bull of Appointment (to be discussed below). Nevertheless on March
10, 1872 a circular from the Holy See forbade any compromise. The bishops
were not to make any move to request the Exequatur.
Don Bosco was certainly aware that the government, fearing the political
backlash from this stalemate or simply out of a desire to see the matter
resolved, was seeking a compromise. He was also aware that both Cardinal
Antonelli and Pius IX had decided to make no concession to what they
perceived as aggression and bad faith. But he did not give up. Writing to Pius
IX on April 8, 1872, he comments on question of the temporalities.
When the government began to raise objections, I immediately wrote t o
Prime Minister Lanza. I reminded him of the formal pledge made by the
government and by the king himself that nothing would be allowed to stand
in the way of the bishops' temporalities. He replied that there was no cause to
worry because the difficulties that had arisen were temporary and would be
resolved, and that the government's position in the matter had not changed at
all.
As time went by, noting that nothing was being done I made further
inquiries but got no reply. I know for a fact that thr: government would like to
move out of this embarrassing situation, but it cannot find a way.10 9
Pius IX replied on May l , 1872, in Latin:
What you write regarding your endeavors to obtain the temporalities that are
due to the bishops is appreciated, and We praise your zeal and concern. But
you know how matters stand, and you understand therefore that it is better to
tum in prayer to God who alone can change people's hearts. Since God
promised the Church perpetual protection, God cannot fail us.110
Apparently Pius IX no longer believed in diplomacy. Was he also telling Don
Bosco that, "zeal and concern" notwithstanding, his diplomatic endeavors were
no longer helpful? Apparently Don Bosco was not ready to stop trying. On
May 21, 1872, he wrote to Prime Minister Lanza asking him to move the
108 Tuninetti, Castaldi II, 53.
109 Motto, Epistolario III, 422-423.
110 IBM X, 570 (original Latin text). Cf. EBM X, 210.

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business of the temporalities along. To help toward this end, he suggested a
compromise formula for notifying the government of the appointment.
In a recent letter to Your Excellency I stated my belief that it would not be too
difficult to come up with an acceptable arrangement, one that would not
require either the government or the Holy See to give up cherished general
principles. I don' t engage in politics, am not involved in public affairs, nor
have I received any mandate to negotiate. But I believe that an authenticated
note from the Holy See would meet the government' s requirements. The note
would state that in the consistory held on such and such a date, such and such
individual was officially appointed bishop to such and such vacant diocesan
see.
Perhaps this or some similar formula that Your Excellency might suggest
will serve the purpose. In this event, should Your Excellency wish to make
use of me to bring it to the attention of the right parties, I should be more
than happy to be of service to my government and of some use to the
Church. 111
We have no record of Lanza's reply, if there was one. But a new move of the
Holy See confirmed what Don Bosco had already surmised from the pope's
letter of May 1. In an open letter to the Cardinal Secretary of State dated June
16, 1872, Pius IX shut the door on negotiations with a government that he
regarded as willfuliy inteifering with the Church's freedom.112
Don Bosco saw that there was nothing to do but wait for a thaw in the
glacial relationship that had developed between the contending parties.
3. Don Bosco's Involvement with the Question of the
Exequaturs in Rome in Early 1873
On February 18, 1873, Don Bosco and his secretary, Father Gioachino Berto
left for Rome where they arrived, after stopovers at Parma, Bologna and
Florence, on February 24. The definitive approval of the Salesian constitutions
was the chief item on Don Bosco's agenda. But he quickly became involved in
a totally private capacity with the issue of the Exequaturs. The day before his
departure from Turin, he had had a meeting with Archbishop Gastaldi on that
very subject. The Archbishop, like other bishops, was impatient with the
delay, and he had been to Rome shortly before to speak with the pope. In
January at Alessandria, contrary to the Holy See's express prohibition, Canon
Giuseppe Bernardo Como on his own initiative had submitted a transcript of
Bishop Giocondo Salvaj's Bull of Appointment and obtained the Exequatur.
111 Don Bosco to Prime Minister Lanza, [Turin,) May 21, 1872, in Motto,
Epistolario Ill, 434.
112 Pius IX to Cardinal Antonelli, June 16, 1872, referred to in Desramaut, DB en
son temps, citing the journal, Civilta cattolica.

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Cardinal Antonelli' s wrath was swift, and the bishop survived only by
apologizing and submitting proof of his innocence.11 3
Father Berto has left diaries of the Roman trips on which he accompanied
Don Bosco, including the present one of 1873. After describing the trip, he
relates (though not in detail) Don Bosco's activities as go-between in the
matter of the Exequaturs. 11•
Not long after his arrival in the city, Don Bosco received an invitation
from Prime Minister Lanza. They discussed the issue of the bishops'
temporalities.115 Apparently at this meeting Lanza presented to Don Bosco
three alternate procedures for requesting the Exequatur instead of the
submission of the original Bull of Appointment. Together they are referred to
as "the four modus vivendi." We have Don Bosco's holograph in a
memorandum which he penned in view, no doubt, of a meeting with Cardinal
Antonelli.
Bishops' Temporalities
The four modus vivendi, so-called, proposed by the Prime Minister and
approved by the Cabinet are:
1. The bishops shall notify their appointment and present the official
Bull in accordance with the law.
2. The cathedral chapter, or the diocesan chancery or other competent
diocesan authority shall submit a summary of the Bull, with a declaration that
nothing has been added [in the original] to the formulation that is customary
in such texts. ·
3. [A competent diocesan authority] shall submit the text of a typical
Bull, with a declaration that the original Bull issued for N. N. agrees with that
text.
4. The secretary of the Consistorial Congregation shall submit in each
case of appointment name, date, and diocese, with a declaration that nothing
has been changed in the official Bull.
Generally speaking it seems that the government is afraid lest secret codes
might be appended or inserted into the Bull. This fear was dispelled to
everyone' s satisfaction. [...]
The second alternate procedure (modus vivendi) appears to be more in
confo rmity with princii;les guiding the Holy See, especially if modified as
follows:
The [Cathedral] Chapter, the chancery or other competent [diocesan]
authority shall forward to the Royal Procurator or other government authority
113 Tuninetti , Gastddi II, 54.
114 Berto, Compendio, in ASC 110 Cronachette, Berto, FDB 906 C8ff., esp. D7-
12; Appunti sul viaggio di D. Bosco a Roma, 1873, FDB 907 Dl2ff., esp. , El-4.
115 Prime Minister Lanza and Don Bosco also discussed the government' s policy
regarding the suppression of religious congregations and the taking over of their
properties in the province of Rome. Earlier Don Bosco had asked Lanza to spare
some convents that were dear to him, in particular the convents of Tor de' Specchi,
of the Bocca della Verita and of Trinita dei Monti. The Prime Minister was able to
reassure him [ASC 110, Berto, "Compendio," FDB 906 Dl l].

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a declaration of appointment. This shall be a statement that in the [papal]
consistory held on (Date) the priest (Name) was officially appointed bishop
of (Diocese) and that the customary Bull (couched in rhe customary terms) has
been sent.
The government seems to have accepted this procedure. However, the
Minister would like to wait till the [parliament's] Easter break, or preferably
till the June recess to put it into effect. At that time the government will not
have co deal with [parliamentary] debate and will proceed as desired. [...]
[Prime Minister] Lanza moreover pledged to protect the Generalates [of
religious orders from confiscation], or [should parliament move against them]
to hand in his resignation. He will also try to compensate the bishops for the
losses sustained because of the necessary delay.
[Signed] Father Giovanni Bosco.116
Berto reports that some time during the meeting with Lanza Don Bosco was
"set upon" by cabinet ministers who argued with him and tried to trick him in
contradictions or compromising statements. He came out of the meeting tired,
bathed in perspiration, flushed, but smiling. To Berto he explained what "those
scoundrnls (canaglia)" were trying to do to him and to "poor Lanza." 117
After the meeting Don Bosco sent the memorandum .with Lanza' a
proposals to Cardinal Antonelli. And on March 15 and 16, 1873 he met again
with both the Prime Minister and the Cardinal.118 However, in spite of the fact
that the Don Bosco-Lanza conversations had made a breakthrough, and the
cardinal seemed to want to go along with the new proposal, no real advance
was made in the new direction. On the one hand Lanza would have to wait for
parliament to recess in June, and on the other Cardinal Antonelli, still
skeptical, adopted a wait and see attitude.
The business of the Society, the approval of the constitutions, had not
gone well either. The revised text Don Bosco had brought to Rome am
submitted to the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars was rejected after
drawing no less than 38 serious critical observations from the examiner.
Therefore after taking leave of Pius IX on March 18, on March 22 with his
secretary he left Rome for Turin. With stops at Florence, Modena and Bologna
a week went by before the travelers were back home on March 29, 1873 .
In Turin Archbishop Gastaldi was also looking for a way to notify his
appointment to the authorities and obtaining the Exequatur, without
submitting the original Bull directly. He proposed to Cardinal Antonelli that
the Bull to the People or a copy thereof might be displayed in the cathedral in a
corner of the sacristy. The reply was that the Archbishop should not take such
a course of action until the Holy See had explored its implications.119
116 Berto, Collection in ASC 112, FDB 789 C8-10 (Don Bosco's holograph),
B4-6 (Berte's transcription).
117 ASC 110 Berto, Compendia, FDB 906 D9-10.
118 Motto, LA Mediazione , 25, Note 66, citing an unpublished letter of Don
Bosco to Cardinal Antonelli, March 15, 1873.
119 Tuninetti, Gastaldi II, 55.

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Meanwhile in early May, the Bill of suppression of religious orders and
confiscation of their properties in the province of Rome began to be debated in
parliament. The Pope voiced his protests and launched excommunications, but
the Bill was passed into law and published on June 26. It would go into effect
in October 1873. Eventually a total of 472 convents and monasteries were
suppressed and some 8000 religious men and women dismissed. The value of
the properties was estimated at 8,000,000 lire.120 Prime Minister Lanza, as
promised, fought hard to save the general houses of religious congregations in
Rome, and he succeeded to some extent. But the parliamentary opposition and
a groundswell of popular anticlerical feeling forced his resignation on June 25,
1873. His government fell on July 5, leaving the question of the Exequaturs
and temporalities unresolved.
4. Don Bosco's Fight for the Exequaturs at the Beginning of
the Ministry of Prime Minister Marco Minghetti and of
Justice Minister Onorato Vigliani (Latter Half of 1873)
On July 10, 1873, Marco Minghetti, designated Prime Minister, formed a new
government, in which Onorato Vigliani took the post of Minister of Justice. A
few days later, on July 14, 1873, Don Bosco wrote to Prime Minister
Minghetti recalling the progress made in meetings with Prime Minister Lanza,
and requesting that the talks be restarted on the basis of the second modified
option.121
[Prime Minister Lanza] put forward four options worked out by the cabinet
ministers, the text of the second, slightly modified, is herewith attached. I
reported the proposals to Cardinal Antonelli and to the Holy Father himself.
All parties understood that once the debate on the Bill against religiou s
corporations was concluded, and parliament adjourned for the summer recess,
the proposal would be put into effect as modified. I hope the new government
still intends to work toward the settlement of a dispute that is harmful to many
and advantageous to no one. I shall be happy again to be of service in any
capacity that may be for the good of my country and of the Church. 122
On July 16, 1873, Prime Minister Minghetti assured Don Bosco that he would
give attention to the matter and get back to him. Come August, there still was
no reply. Don Bosco thought that the delay was occasioned from the fact that
Minister of Justice Vigliani was away taking the waters. The negotiations
would eventually be turned over to Vigliani. In the first week in August Don
Bosco and Cardinal Antonelli carried on a lively correspondence. Don Bosco
120 DeAgostini, Compact, 172.
121 Cf. Don Bosco' s memorandum to Cardinal Antonelli, Note 116 and related
text above.
122 Don Bosco to Marco Minghetti , {Turin,] July 14, 1873, in Motto, La
Mediazione, 64.

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made an updated report to Cardinal Antonelli and needed to know whether
someone else had been ai:;pointed to negotiate, and he should cease and desist-
or did he have the Cardinal's permission "to deal." On August 6 Cardinal
Antonelli gave permission, but he lay down new and more restrictive demands,
thereby making the obtaining of the Exequatur and of the temporalities more
problematic. On August 25, Don Bosco brought to the cardinal' s attention the
discrepancy between the new formula and the procedure agreed upon the
previous March. On September 13, Cardinal Antonelli restated his position,
and told Don Bosco to adhere strictly to it.m In spite of the cardinal's
statement that he just wanted to fix parameters to what had been agreed in
Rome, the new formula forbade any move by the bishop, the chancery, or any
other
diocesan
authority.
The
"inquiry"
was
left
up
to
the
government.
12
•
Don Bosco did not give up, but he had no other option open than to work
with the new intransigent position of Cardinal Secretary of State. Not having
had a reply from Prime Minister Minghetti, on October 12, 1873 he contacted
Onorato Vigliani, to whose department (Ministry of Justice) the matter cfil
pertain. He brought the minister up to date regarding the March agreement with
Prime Minister Lanza, his writing to Prime Minister Minghetti, but not
receiving a reply. Then in an effort to sell the new position he writes.
The March talks dealt only with the procedure [to be followed in seeking the
temporalities] for the bishops to be named in the future. But a second
procedure applicable to bishops already named and in place at the time
(marked Modus Vivendi B on the attached sheet) was agreed upon. Discussion
123 Don Bosco to Cardinal Antonelli, Turin, August 3, 1873; Cardinal Antonelli
to Don Bosco, Rome, August 6, 1873; Don Bosco to Cardinal Antonelli, Turin,
August 25, 1873; Cardinal Antonelli to Don Bosco, Rome, September 13, 1873, all
in Motto, La Media zione, 64-67.
12
•
Cardinal
Antonelli' s formula
ran as follows:
"[The
government]
may
address
an inquiry to the Secretary of the Sacred Congregation of the Consistory regarding
the date [of appointment], the bishops' names, and the dioceses to which they have
been appointed in various consistories. [The secretary of the Congregation] will
gladly provide name, date, and diocese to which each the bishop was appointed. He
will likewise certify that the customary Bulls of appointment were dispatched in
each case" [Letter of August 6, as in Note 123 above].
The alternate procedure recorded in Don Bosco's memorandum is considerably
different. 'The second alternate procedure (modus vivendi) appears to be more in
conformity with the principles guiding the Holy See, especially if modified as
follows : 'The [Cathedral] Chapter or the chancery or other competent [diocesan]
authority shall forward to the Royal Procurator or other government authority a
declaration of appointment. This shall contain a statement to the effect that in the
[papal] consistory held on (Date) the priest (Name) was officially appointed bishop
of (Diocese), and that the customary Bull [of appointment] has been delivered"' [Cf.
Note 116 and Don Bosco's memorandum above].

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Journal of Salesian Studies
[about the implementation] of this second formula, however, was put off to a
more appropriate time.125 [ • •• ]
It seems to me that this Modus Vivendi B is entirely consonant with the
government' s view of the matter and advantageous to it. (1) The government
would be contacting the Holy See and establishing a direct relationship. (2)
The Holy See would respond directly and officially, (3) On receiving the
official list of appointed bishops, the government can judge the merits of the
case in each instance. (4) The government would then be wielding an effective
Exequatur, for it may decide not to grant the temporalities or, if needs be, even
to place appropriate conditions.
In the practical implementation of this plan certain details of the
procedure could be modified, and I believe that the Holy See would raise no
objections. For example where it is said, 'The government may address an
inquiry, etc.," one may take it to be an oral inquiry through a delegate. [... ]
I am totally uninvolved in politics or in public affairs. Hence, should Your
Excellency see fit to make use of my humble services in this matter, there
would be no unwanted publicity. [. ..]126
Minister Vigliani replied immediately. After lamenting the sad condition of the
dioceses in which the bishops were still deprived of the Exequatur, he goes on
to say that Prime Minister Minghetti, who like himself was desirous to see the
conflict resolved, has asked him to look into the matter. But not having found
any files on the previous negotiations, he will need time to consult with
former Prime Minister Lanza. Vigliani, however, shows acquaintance with the
general situation, when he writes:
What's needed is that both sides give evidence of good will and Christian
tolerance. Then a settlement may be reached that satisfies all requirements.
You are a devoted prie>t and a committed citiwn. I beg you therefore to take
the most effective steps to persuade the Holy See to meet the government
halfway. For the government needs to find a way to conciliate the
requirements of the law, which is above the will of any individual minister,
and the concessions that will make the granting of the Exequatur possible.
You may know that the bishops of Alessandria, Saluzzo and Aosta have been
generously granted the Exequatur. Why don' t other bishops follow the good
example of these confreres of theirs. Why can't they find a way, through their
m'The first modus vivendi mentioned here by Don Bosco is the second
alternate formula proposed by Lanza in March 1873. As modified in Don Bosco ' s
memorandum it was the preferred formula, in harmony with the mind of the Holy See
[Cf. Note 116 and Don Bosco's memorandum above]. Don Bosco here mentions a
second mysterious modus vivendi. This is the new formula laid down by Cardinal
Antonelli. Although the Cardinal states that it was the agreement worked out in
March [Cf. Letter of August 6, Note 123 above], it does not appear in Don Bosco ' s
memorandum which lists Lanza's proposed alternate formulae [Cf. Note 124 above].
Is Don Bosco trying to sell the new position of the Holy See to Vigliani?
126 Don Bosco to Minister Vigliani, Turin, October 12, 1873, in Motto, La
Mediazione , 67-68.

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chapters, the local mayors, or other trusted oerson, to forward a transcript of
the Bull of Appointment to the government authority, without seeming to
make an act of submission? I don' t see in this mode of acting anything that
might offend our holy religion.127
As mentioned above, the procedure described by Vigliani and adopted in the
dioceses of Saluzzo, Alessandria and Aosta is what called forth the ire of
Cardinal Antonelli.m It would in any case be ruled out by the Holy See's new
position.
Don Bosco quickly wrote to Cardinal Antonelli on October 20 to acquaint
him with his exchange with Minister Vigliani. He had placed the new position
of the Holy See squarely on the table, but Vigliani had withheld comments,
and had instead cited deviant examples. Don Bosco was willing to travel to
Rome if the Cardinal thought it helpful. Cardinal Antonelli' s reply on
November I restated his intransigent position, forbidding the bishop or any
other diocesan authority to make any move to request the Exequatur. He
couldn't say whether a trip to Rome by Don Bosco would help, "since the
government seems unwilling to do anything right." 129
As the year 1873 came to an end, therefore, several months after first
contacting Prime Minister Minghetti, Don Bosco had to accept the fact that the
contrast remamed unresolved. On December 17, 1873, Archbishop Gastaldi hOO
a notarized copy of the Bull of Appointment displayed in the sacristy of the
cathedral, as was done with the bishop's pastoral letters, an act that could be
interpreted as a petition for the Exequatur. To make matters worse influential
Jay people in Turin started a process whereby the notarized transcript of the
Bull would reach the authorities. Nothing came of it, however. Minister
Vigliani refused to take action because the move had not come from the
archbishop and the document presented was not the original Bull. Gastaldi was
not aware that such action was being taken "on his behalf."130 When Don
Bosco saw the archbishop before leaving for Rome again toward the end of
December, he promised to keep him informed of development. Don Bosco's
letters to the archbishop from Rome (to be cited below) give evidence that
Gastaldi was impatiently waiting for a breakthrough.
127 Minister Vigliani to Don Bosco, Rome, October 15, 1873, in Motto, La
Mediazione, 68-69.
111 For Saluzzo and Alessandria, cf. Notes 108 and 113 and related text above.
129 Don Bosco to Cardinal Antonelli, Turin, October 20, 1873; Cardinal
Antonelli to Don Bosco, Rome, November 1, 1873, in Motto, La Mediazione, 69.
130 Motto, La Mediazione, 36-37.

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Journal of Salesian Studies
5. Don Bosco Involvement with Minister of Justice Vigliani
for the Exequaturs in Rome in 1874131
Don Bosco meanwhile had been revising (though not significantly) the text of
the Salesian constitutions. On December 29, 1873, he left for Rome with his
secretary, Father Gioachino Berto. They arrived on December 30 after a brief
pause in Florence as the guests of Count and Countess Uguccioni-Gherardi.
The business of the definitive approval of the constitution (the main reason for
the trip) would keep them in Rome until the decree of approval on April 13.
But during this protracted stay Don Bosco was determined to continue his
diplomatic activity for the bishops' temporalities, and hopefully get the parties
to agree on a compromise formula. He needed to meet with the parties
immediately, so as to ascertain their respective positions.
(1) Finding a Formula for a General Settlement of the Issue
On December 31, the day after his arrival in Rome, Don Bosco met with
Minister Vigliani and with Cardinal Antonelli. Immediately Don Bosco
understood that the -position of the contending parties differed. In a letter to
Archbishop Gastaldi written that very evening Don Bosco reported words of
Vigliani that revealed the two irreconcilable positions. Vigliani said, "We are
not deroanding that bishops submit a request for the Exequatur, but only for
the temporalities." Don Bosco adds, "But even this second request is ruled out
by order of a higher authority [Cardinal Antonelli]."132 After a new meeting
with Minister Vigliani devoted to discussing the basic forrnula,133 the evening
of January 2, 1874, Don Bosco wrote to Cardinal Antonelli. He reported that
Vigliani wished to modify certain expressions in the formula to forestall
objections that might be raised. Otherwise he accepted the formula in its
entirety, and anticipated no opposition either from the Cabinet or in the
131 Father Berto' s chronicle of the trip and Don Bosco's correspondence are the
chief sources for this the final chapter in our story.
For Berto's chronicle of this trip to Rome and of Don Bosco' s activities there
[Berto, Brevi Appunti], cf. reference in Note I above. Motto [La Mediazione, 38]
discusses the reliability of Berto' s chronicle. Apart from Berto's penchant for
aggrandizing the figure of the master, he finds no reason for doubting these reports.
The Biographical Memoirs carry the reports, reveling in the dialogue and other
detail [EBM X 223-245].
The most important pieces of Don Bosco's correspondence relating to the
Exequaturs are likewise given in Motto, La Mediazione , 56-79, an Appendix from
which letters have already been cited above.
132 Don Bosco to Archbishop Gastaldi, December 31, 1873, in Motto, La
Mediazione, 70.
133 This is the second (modified) formula recorded in Don Bosco' s March, 1872
memorandum as the most acceptable to the Holy See [Cf. Notes 116 and 124 and
related text above].

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Council of State. More meetings took place through the next week including
an audience with Pius IX, and letters were exchanged. Both Minister Vigliani
and Don Bosco were convinced that progress was being made.
But the government's proposal did more than modify certain expressions
in the basic formula, for it required the bishop to notify the Ministry of his
appointment and entrance into the diocese. The position of the Holy See
emphatically ruled out any action on the bishop's part that might be construed
as a request for the Exequatur or simply for the temporalities. It also ruled out
displaying the Bulls to the Clergy and to the Chapter in the sacristy of the
cathedral. On the other hand, the government required that all the Bulls be
shown, or at least the Bull to the People with an accurate description of the
contents of the others. But, making a juridical distinction, it required only that
the bishop request the temporalities, not the Exequatur.
A person of lesser staying power would have despaired- not Don Bosco.
His numerous conversations and exchanges with the parties concerned must
have convinced him that an understanding was possible if a fresh approach were
adopted. The principle to be safeguarded was that in any formula the bishop
must not be required directly to submit the request. Hence Don Bosco, either
single-handedly or in collaboration with others, came up with the following
new proposal.
Avoiding any personal involvement, the bishop has the Bull ad capitulum
(and perhaps that ad episcopum as well) displayed in the sacristy of the
cathedral or in some other appropriate place. Anyone, including a notary
public, is allowed to make authentic copies [of the Bull]. Then the mayor, the
prefect, or the royal procurator shall be asked to forward this authenticated
transcript to the Ministry of Justice. The Mimster contacts the bishop i n
writing to inquire whether by that act he intends to request the temporalities.
The bishop replies in the affirmative, and that he does so in order that any
obstacle in the way of the free exercise of his pastoral ministry may be
removed. He asks the Minister to see to it that the obstacles are removed and
the temporalities granted. Finally the Minister sets in motion the process
whereby the temporalities are granted, and the bishop and his signature
legally recognized.134
The new formula seemed to satisfy all requirements, so that on January 11 Don
Bosco could write reassuringly to Archbishop Gastaldi, who was impatient to
see the issue resolved.
I hasten to notify Your Excellency of the fact that good progress has been
made in the matter under consideration. The formula accepted by the Holy See
has also been approved by Vigliani and by the cabinet. Some time next week
it will be put before the Council of State, hopefully also with a favorable
outcome. After which, if the devil won't stick his finger in the pie, there will
134 Berto, Collection, in ASC 112 Vescovi, FDB 789 B7 (transcription signed
by Berto with the note that it agrees with Don Bosco's holograph).

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Journal of Salesian Studies
be immediate implementation. Vigliani has repeatedly told me that the
presentation of the Bull to the People would suffice, provided it i s
accompanied by the statement that it was for the purpose of obtaining the
temporalities. [... ] I ask you therefore to wait out this week and the next, after
which you shall hear fro m me. If the present plan won't work, I will ask
Cardinal Antonelli about displaying the Bull ad clerum in the sacristy. To
date, however, he has not allowed bishops to request the Exequatur. 135
On January 15, after a new round of talks with Minister Vigliani and Cardinal
Antonelli, Don Bosco had real cause for optimism. His letter of January 16 to
Archbishop Gastaldi is really upbeat.
Agreement in the matter under consideration has been reached. Both parties
have accepted the formula. An authentic copy will be sent to Your Excellency
this coming Monday together with a form letter to be addressed by each
bishop to the Minister of Justice. 136
On January 19 the Congregation of the Consistory sent the protocols to the
archbishop, testifying to his official appointment. A :::over note by Cardinal
Antonelli specified that both documents and bishop' s letter should be addressed
to Minister Vigliani. It was understood that no publicity should be given to
this agreement and that no action was to be taken by the bishop before matters
were finalized in Rome. Unfortunately Archbishop Gastaldi began to speak
about the issue as resolved and on January 22, disregarding Don Bosco's pleas
for patience, he took matters into his own hands and sent his file of documents
to the Royal Procurator (not to the Minister of Justice, as instructed.)
Don Bosco learned the facts from the Minister himself who was angry
with the Archbishop, as was Cardinal Antonelli. Don Bosco's disappointment
is voiced in a letter of January 24 to Gastaldi.
Everything seemed to be falling into place-now this.[... ] People here wanted
explanations, especially when it became known that a newspaper [in Turin]
published a point by point account of the transaction. The Council of Seate
meeting earlier today was in a state of bewilderment, and motions were made
that will be presented tomorrow. ln any case, I have been told to ask Your
Excellency to keep this whole business under strictest secrecy. [.. .] Some
Members of Parlia.'llent have made inquiries at the Mir.istry regarding the truth
of reports that have appeared in some newspapers. Clearly the devil has had a
hand in this.137
135 Don Bosco to Archbishop Gastaldi, Rome, January 11 , 1874, in Motto,
La Mediazione, 71-72.
136 Don Bosco to Archbishop Gastaldi, Rome, January 16, 1874, in Motto, La
Mediazione, 72.
137 Don Bosco to Archbishop Gastaldi, Rome, January 24, 1874, in Motto, La
Mediazione, 72-73.

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(2) Breakdown in the Negotiations
On January 26, Don Bosco discussed the situation with Cardinal Antonelli,
who strongly condemned Gastaldi's action. However, the breakdown in the
negotiations cannot ultimately be imputed to Gastaldi's indiscretion, or to the
action of a few others who had similarly taken matters into their own hands.138
Don Bosco' s activities in Rome could not escape the unwanted attention of the
anticlerical press. Throughout January and February, in good or bad faith, the
anticlerical newspapers went on the attack. They inveighed against a liberal
government that was about to buckle under the demands of the Holy See and
that was making "illegal" concessions in view of a "reconciliation." [!] Nor
were conservative clerical newspapers, such as La Voce della Veritii (The Voice
of Truth) of Rome, less hostile. Don Bosco came in for a drubbing. 139
The outcry from the anticlerical press over the government's imagined
attempts at a "reconciliation," or simply over "concessions" made to the Holy
See, had international repercussions. On February 2 Don Bosco had a long
imerview with Cardinal Antonelli in which he learned that the issue of the "
bishops' Exequaturs had become entangled in international diplomacy. It had in
fact even raised the hackles of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck of Germany.
Father Berto reports in his chronicle:
As we were going down the stairs and out of the Vatican, Don Bosco said to
me: "Do you want to know why our government no longer wishes to proceed
with the matter of the bishops' Exequaturs? The reason is that it has received a
diplomatic note from Bismarck forbidding any accommodation."140
138 On January 8, Archbishop Balma of Cagliari (one of Don Bosco's
"nominees") had obtained the Exequatur, and there had been questions asked of the
government in parliament. Cardinal Antonelli had not been amused when he learned
that the Bull to the People had not only been displayed in the sacristy of the
Cathedral, but had been submitted to the Ministry [Motto, La Mediazione, 51).
139 Details and quotes in Motto, La Mediazione, 41-46. Mgr. Saverio Nardi's
attack on Don Bosco (described as "a partisan of compromise") came in the issue of
February I, 1874 of La Voce delta Verita. This newspaper was the organ of an
intransigent, ultramontane society established in Rome in defense of the Holy See.
The article, which took even Don Bosco by surprise, drew cogent rebuttals from
other more moderate Catholic newspapers. Don Bosco himself had Father Berto
take down and mail a strongly worded note of protest to Mgr. Nardi [Text given in
Berto, Brevi Appunti, 55, entry of February 16, 1874, in ASC 110 Cronachette,
Berto, FDB 909 Bl2].
140 Berto, Brevi Appunti, 45, in ASC 110 Cronachette, Berto, FDB 909 Al2.
German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck was a dominant political figure in Europe
after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. His Kulturkampf program led to a
ruthless repression of Catholicism in Germany. His influence was especially felt in
Italy where anticlerical governments were engaged in similar ecclesiastical
policies. Instances of intervention and political pressure by the Chancellor in
Italian affairs are given by Motto [La Mediazione, 47-48).

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Journal of Salesian Studies
Some time in February, in a letter to Archbishop Gastaldi sent through a
trusted messenger, Don Bosco voiced the same conviction.
With the definitive agreement signed by the Minister of Justice and approved
by the Holy See [... ], nothing, so we thought, could stand in the way. So we
thought! Then I was sent for [by the Minister] and given an earful of the
wrongdoing of the archbishop of Turin-that he had leaked information, and
the newspapers had gotten hold of it [...], etc. But such recriminations were
just a screen to hide the fact that the day before the government had received a
bristling letter from [Chancellor] Bismarck calling for an end to attempts at
reconciliation, especially as it concerns the bishops, etc. The negotiations
have not been broken off, but they have been shelved.141
Bismarck's intervention in this instance is not separately attested, but it is not
at all unlikely. The fact is that the government retreated from commitments
already made. Don Bosco had further conversations with Minister Vigliani on
February 11 and March 3, with Cardinal Antonelli on March l, and with Pius
IX on March 4. But by March 1874 negotiations for the bishops' temporalities
had come to an end and were for all practical purposes dead.
(3) Practical Expedients Become the Norm
Most of the bishops were still waiting for the Exequatur and the temporalities,
without which they could not exercise their pastoral ministry. Attempt at
negotiating a general form11Ja for the bishops already appointed and waiting and
for tho~e to be appointed in the future had failed. Each bishop therefore had to
proceed as seemed best in each individual case. Thus to Archbishop Fissore of
Vercelli who was asking for guidelines, Don Bosco replied that the Archbishop
could try to display the Bull to the People (and perhaps also the Bull to the
Chapter). ·
I am herewith enclosing a procedure by which some bishops, such as those of
Susa and Aosta as I am told, have obtained their temporalities. The Holy See
does not object to the procedure. At first displaying the Bull to the Chapter
had been permitted. This was later reversed, so that only the Bull to the
People may be displayed. [...]142
A few days later in similar circumstances Don Bosco made the same
suggestion
to
Archbishop
Gastaldi.
1
'
3
The
procedure
suggested in
these
cases
1
'
1
Don
Bosco
to
Archbishop
Gastaldi,
[Rome]
February,
1874,
in
Mono,
La
Mediazione , 74.
12
•
Don
Bosco
the
Archbishop
Fissore,
Rome,
March
9,
1874,
in
Motto,
La
Mediazione , 74.
143 Don Bosco to Archbishop Gastaldi, Rome, March 14, 1874, in Motto. La
Mediazione, 75.

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Politics of the "Our Father" and of the Holy Father
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was the very one that Don Bosco had devised and that H1e parties had agreed to,
though at the time there was disagreement as to which Bull should or could be
displayed. 144
Throughout his Roman sojourn Don Bosco did not neglect the important
business of the Salesian Society, the approval of its constitutions. This was
no foregone conclusion. On the contrary it was a long drawn-out struggle
centering especially on the structures for priestly and religious formation
embodied in the constitutions. Against Don Bosco's efforts to retain certain
features dear to him the examiners of the Congregation of Bishops am
Regulars and the Cardinals of the general congregations introduced important
modifications before recommending approval. The Decree of approval was
signed on April 13, 1874. Don Bosco had lost the battle of the Exequaturs, but
he won the battle of the Salesian Society.
The next day, April 14, Don Bosco and Father Berto left Rome and were
back in Turin (via Florence) on April 16. Don Bosco met with Archbishop
Gastaldi, according to Father Berto' s chronicle, the afternoon of April 18. Berto
reports nothing of the conversation, except that "it wasn' t about the affairs of
the Salesian Congregation."14s The fact is that without delay the archbishop
prepared his request for the Exequatur, which was forwarded by the Royal
Procurator to Minister Vigliani together with the Bulls to the Chapter and to
the Clergy. The Decree granting Exequatur and temporalities was signed by the
king on May 15, 1874.
By and by the Holy See conceded. Not only could the Bull to the People
be displayed in the sacristy of the cathedral or submitted, but other Bulls as
well. One bishop after another took advantage of the concession. And although
the government still claimed the right of judging the merit of each case, by the
end of 1874 many bishops had obtained Exequatur and temporalities. By 1876,
this practice was allowed by the Holy See to become the norm "in view of
circumstances." 146
Conclusion
The story told in this article has shown, if nothing else, the considerable extent
of Don Bosco' s mediating activity undertaken over and above the thousand
concerns of a founder. The occasional critical exceptions taken to elements in
the Salesian tradition do not detract quantitatively or qualitatively from this
remarkable involvement. But as we stand back and ponder this "side activity"
undertaken over a period of some 20 years, we are tempted to ask, How drl
Don Bosco get involved, and why Don Bosco?
144 Cf. Note 134 and related text above.
1•s Berto, Breci Appunti, 111, in ASC 110 Cronachette, Berto, FDB 910 B9.
146 Motto, Ui Mediazione, 55-57; Desramaut, DB en son temps, 867 and 881,
note 112.

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Journal of Salesian Studies
Part of the answer comes from a consideration of Don Bosco the man,
living and working in those historic years of change. Don Bosco was known
"on both sides of the Tiber." The Piedmontese ruling class, people like the
Cavours, Rattazzi, Lanza, etc. who were the architects of the liberal revolution
and of the unification of Italy, knew and admired him and his humanitarian
work. From 1849 on he was also personally known to Pius IX and to his
Secretary of State, Cardina! Giacomo Antonelli. The fact that he was a
Piedmontese humanitarian and a priest made him acceptable to both sides. He
was liked and trusted, for his personality and character had much to recommend
him. His approach to people was simple, direct, sincere, unpretentious, and
completely non-threatening. This explains why he might be asked to carry
messages or to sound out the opposition. On his part, his intuitive intelligence
could quickly divine where possibilities lay. Then his trust in God and in the
basic decency of people, no matter what their stripe, made him confident and
fearless. For in some instances Don Bosco did not wait to be asked. He took
the initiative; as one might say, he volunteered.
Another aspect of the question regarding Don Bosco's involvement
should be considered: he was a man of faith and a man of the Church. He
thought it his strict duty to offer his services in any matter that he regarded as
vital for the Church and the good of souls. His Catholic Christian and Church
commitments made him totally available on this point. This is what he meant
when he emphasized that his politics were the politics "of the Our Father." For
the good of the Church and of souls he was ready to leave everything aside,
even what was closest to his heart, the business of the Salesian Society. When
summoned by Prime Minister Lanza in 1871 , Don Bosco did not hesitate to
leave his Salesians on retreat, which was very important to him, with the
words:
The good of the Church must come first; it has priority even over the good of
our congregation. I shall take the 7 o'clock train this evening, travel the
whole night, and be in Florence early tomorrow for my meeting at the
M i n i s t r y . 147
Don Bosco' s idea of Church was at once simple and complex. The Church was
a spiritual and a faith reality established in society as a religious institution.
For him it was also Roman and papal in a very anthropomorphic, almost
plastic, sense. Temporal power, accruing to the pope by right, was an
important element, of this socially incarnate ecclesiology. Hence Don Bosco's
politics "of the Our Father," totally directed towards religious aims, in the
historic confrontation of Church and liberal State in Italy became the politics
"of the Holy Father."
True, Don Bosco himself went on record as being non-political. He
dutifully followed Pius IX' s policy of withdrawal from political activity, as
147 Cf. Note 92 and related text above.

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mandated by the pope's Non Expedit of 1868 and 1874. He prescribed the same
policy for his Salesians, and even for his Salesian Cooperators. Thus he could
trmhfully write to Prime Minister Lanza, "I don't engage in politics, am not
involved in public affairs, nor have I rec~ived any mandate to negotiate."us He
wished to emphasize that the appointment of bishops to vacant sees airl
obtaining for them the material assets, or temporalities, for the exercise of
their pastoral ministry had a purely religious aim, for the good of the people.
Lanza would have agreed. Such negotiations did not aim at political
reconciliation or at solving the Roman Question . Yet the negotiations
themselves and every step taken toward a general settlement for the filling of
vacant diocesan sees had political implications. For one thing, it demanded
concessions that would change the political posture of the government and of
the Holy See toward each other. For another, the granting of the Exequatur in
particular, recognized the diocese as a juridical corporation.
In the 1864 edition of the constitutions, Don Bosco included an article
prohibiting political activity to the Salesians. When Don Bosco petitioned for
approval, the article was ordered removed. Later, in an address to the First
Salesian General Chapter (1877), Don Bosco quoted the reason given for its
removal by the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars:
Of itself [the article] appears to be generally acceptable, but in thi s day and
age circumstances may well force one in conscience to enter the political
arena, since politics are often inseparable from religion. In such cases good
Catholics cannot be forbidden political activity. [... ] We may therefore get
involved in politics when it is advantageous and genuinely advisable.149
Don Bosco's extended activity in mediating the appointment of bishops, as the
royal Exequatur and the temporalities certainly appears to be a case in point.
148 Cf. Note 111 and related text above.
149 ASC 04: Capitoli Generali, GC I, Session 4, September 7, 1877, Barberis'
Original Minutes, 53-55, FDB 1,843 C12-D2 (also in Transcribed Minutes, FDB
1,849 CS). EBM XIII, 195 needs correction.